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The author examines recent cases that have
transplanted the doctrine of legitimate expectations
from British into Canadian law. He concludes that the
doctrine has been applied in a confused way in this
country, without proper consideration of its "fit" with
the Canadian duty of fairness. He argues that the place
of the doctrine should be to determine what fairness
requires when statements or actions of a decisionmaker
have led to a legitimate expectation. The suggestion
that it should be an exception to the rule that legislative
decisions do not attract the duty of fairness is rejected
in favour of a broader concept that focuses on the
nature of the interest and political power of the person
or group affected.
L'auteur examine les d6cisions r6centes ayant
transplant6 la doctrine britannique de l'attente legitime
en droit canadien. II conclut que cette doctrine fut
appliqude de maniere confuse dans ce pays, sans
considerer si elle pouvait cadrer avec l'obligation
d'6quit6 au Canada. II soutient que le r8le de cette
doctrine est de d6terminer les exigences de l'6quit6
lorsque des d6clarations ou des actes pos6s par un
decideur ont men6 A l'attente legitime. La suggestion
que cette doctrine constitue une exception la regle
voulant que les d6ecisions 16gislatives n'attirent pas
l'obligation d6quit6 est rejet6e en faveur d'un concept
plus large se concentrant sur la nature de l'int6r~t et le
pouvoir politique d'une personne ou d'un groupe
affect6.
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I. INTRODUCTION
The doctrine of legitimate expectations has been a
much-discussed topic in Canadian administrative law in recent years. In
the late 1980s and the 1990s, in particular, the doctrine was raised by
plaintiffs in many cases, which emerged in a variety of different legal and
social contexts. Applicants argued that this British concept, which, in
that country, extends the situations in which the duty of fairness is owed,
should also apply in Canada. The Supreme Court has accepted this
argument and transplanted the doctrine to Canada, although its
judgments have also considerably restricted the situations in which it
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applies.1 Commentators, too, have strongly supported the importation
of legitimate expectations, and have argued that the courts should use
the doctrine to expand the Canadian concept of fairness.2
This article will critically examine the Canadian cases in which
the doctrine has been raised, and will suggest that a broadened concept
of legitimate expectations would be an inappropriate way to build on the
duty of fairness. Legitimate expectations is a British concept, designed
for British administrative law, and its confused application in Canada
has shown that it cannot be easily transplanted here;3 It has been
applied without much consideration for the Canadian context, leading to
ambiguity about the role of the doctrine and its legal effects. For these
reasons, I believe, legitimate expectations should not simply be imported
from British cases without changes or used as a tool to expand upon the
duty of fairness. Rather, its place in Canadian administrative law should
be clearly defined, distinguished from the British concept, and limited.
Focusing on legitimate expectations will, in my opinion, restrict the
development of the concept of fairness rather than expand it.
Nevertheless, the legitimate expectation cases do point to the
need for a broader vision of the duty of fairness. It is appropriate to give
legal effects to decisionmakers' promises about the procedures they will
follow or the decisions they will make. Many of the cases also show that
the exclusion of "legislative" decisions from the duty of fairness is too
restrictive, and ignores the fact that certain groups of people may have a
special interest in such decisions analogous to that of an individual.
Some commentators have argued that legitimate expectations should be
developed in Canada as the exception, or one of the exceptions, to the
rule that legislative decisions do not attract a duty of fairness. 4 I will
I Old St Boniface Residents Assn. v. Wimnipeg (City), [1990] 3 S.C.R. 1170 [hereinafter Old St.
Boniface]; and Reference Re Canada Assistance Plan (B.C.), [1991]2 S.C.R. 525 [hereinafter cAP].
2 See D.J. Mullan, "Canada Assistance Plan-Denying Legitimate Expectation a Fair Start?"
(1993) 7 Admin. L.R. (2d) 269 [hereinafter "Fair Start"]; J.G. Small, "Legitimate Expectations,
Fairness and Delegated Legislation" (1994-95) 8 Can J. Admin. L. & P. 129; G. Cartier, "La th6orie
des attentes l6gitimes en droit administratif" (1992) 23 R.D.U.S. 75; D. Shapiro, "Legitimate
Expectations and its Application to Canadian Immigration Law" (1992) 8 J. L. & Soc. Pol'y 282; and
P.A. MacPherson, "The Legitimate Expectation Doctrine and its Application to Administrative
Policy" (1995-96) 9 Can. J. Admin. L. & P. 141.
3 But see Cartier, supra note 2 at 109-10. She suggests, at 109, that the Canadian concept of
procedural fairness is similar, as it now stands, to the concept of fairness in British law in 1969, when
the doctrine of legitimate expectations was introduced and concludes, at 110, "nous sommes d'avis
que cette doctrine peut ais~ment s'intgrer aux r~gles existantes en ce domaine [l'quit6
procdurale]."
4 See Small, supra note 2; "Fair Start," supra note 2; and MacPherson, supra note 2.
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argue that this would not be appropriate. Given the narrow definition of
the concept of legitimate expectations and the structure of the doctrine
of fairness in Canada, using legitimate expectations to expand fairness
into delegated policy decisions would set in place a restrictive rule that
would lead to few legislative decisions being reviewable. Instead, I
believe, a broader, more flexible view should promote the participation
of and consultation with groups and individuals particularly affected by
such decisions, who may not be represented through the democratic
process.S This would require looking at the nature of the plaintiffs'
interest in the decision and their relation to the decisionmaker. There is
no reason to rely on the outdated and complicated British concept of
legitimate expectations, especially at a time when some in Britain are
suggesting that the legitimate expectations doctrine is too restrictive.6
Other doctrines can better and more flexibly respond to the needs of
Canada in the 1990s, though these doctrines may be based on some of
the principles that guide the concept of legitimate expectations.
This article is divided into seven parts. Part II will briefly
compare and contrast the circumstances in which the duty of fairness
applies in Britain and Canada. The third part will examine the
development and application of the concept of legitimate expectations in
Britain through an examination of the leading cases in that country. Part
IV will examine various early and often conflicting judicial ideas about
the place and application of the concept in Canadian law. It will then
discuss the two Supreme Court decisions that have addressed the issue.
In the fifth part, I will discuss the applications of the concept in recent
Canadian cases. In Part VI, I will develop my argument that: (i) the
doctrine needs to be clarified, restated, and its place limited; and (ii)
that expanding the duty of fairness into legislative decisionmaking
should be done, but not through the doctrine of legitimate expectations.
II. THE THRESHOLD FOR THE DUTY OF FAIRNESS
IN BRITAIN AND CANADA
In Nicholson v. Haldimand-Norfolk (Regional) Police
Commissioners,7 the Supreme Court of Canada recognized the existence
5 See G.J. Craven, "Legislative Action by Subordinate Authorities and the Requirement of a
Fair Hearing" (1988) 16 Melb. U. L. Rev. 569 at 592-99.
6 See, for example, P.P. Craig, Administrative Law, 3d ed. (London: Sweet & Maxwell, 1994)
at 256-62 [hereinafterAdministrative Law].
7 [1979] 1 S.C.R. 311 [hereinafterNicholson].
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of a general duty of fairness owed when administrative decisions are
being made, and eliminated the distinctions between judicial, quasi-
judicial, and administrative decisions. In Cardinal v. Director of Kent
Institution,8 the Court held that this duty lies "on every public authority
making an administrative decision which is not of a legislative nature
and which affects the rights, privileges or interests of an individual." 9
The fact that decisions of a legislative nature are not reviewable for
procedural fairness was emphasized by the Supreme Court in Canada
(A.G.) v. Inuit Tapirisat of Canada.lO InBoard of Education of the Indian
Head School Division No. 19 of Saskatchewan v. Knight,1 1
L'Heureux-Dub6 J. held that the general duty of fairness applies when a
decision is "administrative and specific" but not if it is "legislative and
general."12 In Knight and Nicholson, it was reiterated that while the duty
of fairness applies in a broad range of contexts, the precise procedures
required are to be flexibly determined and depend on the circumstances
of the particular case at issue.
The British equivalent to Nicholson was Ridge v. Baldwin.1 3
However, there was no general statement in Britain as there was in
Cardinal that almost all government decisions affecting individuals are
subject to the duty of fairness or natural justice. As my discussion of the
cases will show, legitimate expectations developed in response to this
need, but while privileges are a general concept, legitimate expectations
arise in more specific circumstances. In British law, it is currently
necessary to demonstrate a right, interest, or legitimate expectation in
order for the duty of fairness to apply. Legitimate expectations were
developed to identify the situations in which procedural protections
would be accorded when legal "rights" or "interests," traditionally
defined, were not at issue] 4 As one commentator has argued, the
development of legitimate expectations in Britain was about giving
procedural rights to holders of forms of "new property"lS-licences,
benefits, and other privileges, but also denying them to those who were
8 [1985] 2 S.C.R. 643 [hereinafter Cardinal].
9 bid. at 653.
10 [1980] 2 S.C.R. 735 [hereinafter Inuit Tapirisat].
11 [1990] 1 S.C.R. 653 [hereinafter Knight].
12 Ibid. at 670.
13 [1964] A.C. 40 (H.L).
14 P. Elias, "Legitimate Expectations and Judicial Review" in J.L. Jowell & D. Oliver, eds.,
New Directions in Judicial Review: Current Legal Problems (London: Stevens & Sons, 1988) 37 at 37.
15 See C.A. Reich, "The New Property" (1964) 73 Yale L. 733.
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claiming such privileges for the first time, or whose interests arose in
other circumstances that did not fit the definition of legitimate
expectations.16 In Canada, these would usually be defined as interests or
privileges.
British courts have been somewhat more willing than their
Canadian counterparts to review policy decisions, those classified in
Canada as "legislative" rather than "administrative." 17 The general rule
that legislative functions are not subject to the duty of fairness exists in
Britain as it does in Canada.18 However, legitimate expectations are
seen as an exception to this rule, and cases where the doctrine is pleaded
often arise when general decisions about policy are being challenged. In
Britain, whenever the plaintiff does not have a "legal right" to what the
decisionmaker is awarding, the issue is whether there is a legitimate
expectation. It is unimportant whether the decision is classified as
legislative or administrative.19
From this summary, the following comparisons emerge. The
Canadian concept of "rights, interests, or privileges" is broader than the
British concept of "rights, interests, or legitimate expectations," since
there are privileges that would not be classified as legitimate
expectations. However, a legislative decision that affects privileges is not
subject to the duty of fairness in Canada, while a legislative decision
affecting legitimate expectations is subject to review in Britain.
Therefore, someone subject to an administrative decision who had a
privilege but not a legitimate expectation would have procedural
protection in Canada but not in.Britain; someone subject to a legislative
decision who had a legitimate expectation would have protection in
Britain but not in Canada.
The fact that procedural protection exists in Britain but not in
Canada in the latter situation illustrates why the doctrine of legitimate
expectations seems desirable in Canadian administrative law. However,
this contrast also illustrates the difficulty in applying the concept
coherently in Canadian law, and shows one situation (the former) in
which relying on legitimate expectations could represent a step backward
for Canadian conceptions of the duty of fairness. This is especially true
16 R. Baldwin & D. Home, "Expectations in a Joyless Landscape" (1986) 49 Mod. L. Rev. 685.
17 Small, supra note 2 at 145.
18 Administrative Law, supra note 6 at 288.
19 Small, supra note 2 at 145.
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because the Canadian conception of a legitimate expectation, at least as
it has developed to this date, is much narrower than the British one.20
British courts' greater willingness to apply a duty of fairness to
policy decisions comes, I believe, from their general willingness to review
and overturn exercises of discretion, often on the part of the executive.
David Mullan suggests that there are several reasons for British judges'
interference with policy decisions. In Britain, fewer tasks have been
delegated to regulatory agencies and tribunals than in Canada, so courts
are more accustomed to reviewing decisions made (at least nominally)
by a minister. This has also led to a vast jurisprudence overturning
delegated policy decisions (often made by local councils) on grounds of
unreasonableness. 21 Often, this has played out in expressly political
terms, with judges being criticized for finding decisions unreasonable
simply because they did not agree with them, sometimes because of the
political party that made them.22 It is understandable, then, why British
courts would be less reluctant to hold that a duty of fairness applies to
these decisions. This is emphasized by the fuzzy boundary between
review for unreasonableness and legitimate expectations in many British
decisions. The implication of a duty of fairness (although in limited
circumstances) to policy decisions may have been a spillover from the
interventionist conception of review for unreasonableness.
Perhaps Canadian judges' reluctance to expand fairness into
policy decisions can also be partly explained by the fact that the doctrine
of fairness developed as the courts were being given the power to review
the content of legislative decisions under the Canadian Charter of Rights
and Freedoms.2 3 Since the courts were struggling with their new
explicitly defined role in the legislative and policy process, and often
were being criticized for it, they may have been more hesitant to
develop, in administrative law, doctrines that would also affect (and in
some people's minds, interfere with) the policy-making process.
20 See Parts IV and V, below.
21 D.J. Mullan, "Judicial Deference to Executive Decision-Making: Evolving Concepts of
Responsibility" (1993) 19 Queen's L.J. 137 at 148-49 [hereinafter "Judicial Deference"].
22 Ibid. at 161. See P. McAuslan, "Administrative Law, Consumption and Judicial Policy"
(1983) 46 Mod. L. Rev. 1 at 14-20. See also Administrative Law, suprdnote 6 at 433-38 for several
examples.
23 Part I of the Constitution Act, 1982, being Schedule B to the Canada Act 1982 (U.K.), 1982,
c. 11 [hereinafter Charter].
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III. THE DEVELOPMENT OF LEGITIMATE
EXPECTATIONS IN BRITAIN
Although the doctrine of legitimate expectations has been
relatively recent in making its appearance in Canada, it has developed in
Britain over the last thirty years. The description of the leading cases in
this part will show that the following situations generate legitimate
expectations and lead to the implication of a duty of procedural fairness
when a decision is at the discretion of an administrative body. First,
where the nature of the interest is such that the person has a right to
expect that the privilege will continue (as in, for example, the case of a
licence), a hearing of some sort is required before the benefit can be
withdrawn. Second, if the decisionmaker has made a representation that
a procedure in accordance with natural justice will be followed, this will
be respected. In addition, if there is a regular practice of according a
hearing or other procedure, this procedure will be accorded in the
future. Finally, if a representation is made that a certain decision will be
made or certain criteria will be applied, the agency will be bound to
accord natural justice to a person before applying different criteria or
making a different decision.24 Nevertheless, the British cases have been
careful to avoid specific definitions of what constitutes a legitimate
expectation, so there has never been a clear, coherent judicial definition
of the legal doctrine.
A. Schmidt
The first appearance of legitimate expectations was in the
judgment of Lord Denning M.R. in Schmidt v. Secretary of State for
Home Affairs.25 The Home Office, which administered the Aliens Order,
1953,26 had a policy of according aliens studying at a "recognised
educational establishment" 27 a permit to live in Britain. The plaintiffs
had been admitted to study at the Hubbard College of Scientology and
were given permits to stay in the country for a certain period of time.
The home secretary, because of concerns about Scientology, announced
24 p.p. Craig, "Legitimate Expectations: A Conceptual Analysis" (1992) 108 L. Q. Rev. 79 at
82-85 [hereinafter "Conceptual Analysis"].
25 [1969] 2 Ch. 149 (C.A.) [hereinafter Schmidt].
26 S.I. 1953/1671, arts. 1(1), 5(1), (3).
2 7 Schmidt, supra note 25 at 153.
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that the college would no longer be considered a "recognised
educational establishment." When the plaintiffs applied for renewal of
their permits, they were refused. They alleged that this constituted a
denial of natural justice, since they were not given a hearing before this
decision was made.
Lord Denning emphasized that, since the plaintiffs were aliens,
they were only entitled to remain in the country "by licence of the
Crown."28 He held that the duty to allow representations to be made
"depends on whether [the plaintiff] has some right or interest, or, I
would add, some legitimate expectation, of which it would not be fair to
deprive him without hearing what he has to say."29 In this case there was
no legitimate expectation because the permits were for a limited time,
which had expired. However, Lord Denning stated that the plaintiffs
would have been entitled to a hearing if their permits had been revoked
before they expired. Were this the case, they would have had a
legitimate expectation of being allowed to remain in the country for the
time specified, which would have entitled them to a hearing 0 With
these obiter comments, the doctrine was introduced into British
administrative law. Although the concept was not clearly defined, it was
held that a legitimate expectation triggered the right to a hearing and to
the protections of natural justice where a discretionary decision was
being made. Lord Denning outlined at least one situation where an
expectation was legitimate-where a permit or licence was given for a
certain period and was withdrawn before its expiry.
B. Liverpool Taxi
The doctrine was further developed in R. v. Liverpool
Corporation, ex parte Liverpool Taxi Fleet Operators' Association.31
Although this decision was also written by Lord Denning, the words
"legitimate expectation" themselves never appear in the judgment. It
has nevertheless become accepted as a leading case on the doctrine.
The number of taxi licences in Liverpool had been limited by the county
council to 300 for some time. When the taxicab owners' association
heard that the council was considering increasing the number of taxi
28 Ibid. at 170.
29 Ibid.
3 0 Ibid. at 171.
31 [1972] 2 Q.B. 299 (C.A.) [hereinafter Liverpool Taxi].
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licences, it expressed concern, and received letters from the town clerk
assuring it that there would be opportunities for the taxicab owners to
make representations and that "interested parties would be fully
consulted." 32 The taxicab owners were represented by counsel before a
meeting of a city council subcommittee, which did recommend an
increase in the number of licences. After the city council meeting which
approved these minutes, the subcommittee chair announced that the
number of licences would not be increased until national legislation,
then pending, to restrict "private hire cabs" was in force. This
undertaking was confirmed in a letter to the association. Nevertheless,
several months later, without informing the association, the committee
and the city council decided to begin increasing the number of licences
almost immediately. Although the owners asked for a hearing when they
indirectly heard about the pending resolution, this was denied to them.
The association's demand that the council not act on the
resolution without first giving it a hearing was granted. Lord Denning
held that because of their "interest" in the number of taxi licences in
existence it was the duty of the council to give them a hearing before any
change in the number of licences was authorized. In addition, an
undertaking was given following that hearing that the number of cabs
would not be increased until Parliament's legislation was in effect. Lord
Denning held that this promise gave the plaintiffs a right to another
hearing if a decision was to be made contrary to it. He wrote:
So long as the performance of the undertaking is compatible with their public duty, they
must honour it. And I should have thought that this undertaking was so compatible. At
any rate they ought not to depart from it except after the most serious consideration and
hearing what the other party has to say: and then only if they are satisfied that the
overriding public interest requires it.33
This passage establishes that if an undertaking has been given by a public
body, it cannot be changed without at least giving the affected person a
chance to be heard. It is important to note that the undertaking to
which Lord Denning was referring was that the number of licences
would not be increased until Parliament had passed its legislation. This
was not a representation that a procedure would be followed, but a
promise that a policy being put into place would be respected. Lord
Denning held that this substantive promise could not be broken without
giving the owners special procedural rights.
32 Ibid. at 306.
33 Ibid. at 308.
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Liverpool Taxi appeared to establish a broad basis for the
concept of legitimate expectations. The power to increase the number
of taxi licences was a decision based on public policy considerations,
made by elected officials. Although those who had taxicab licences
before the decision were particularly affected by it (it would affect the
amount of their business, the value of their licences, etc.), it could be
said that the decision also had the potential to have large effects on all
the citizens of Liverpool. It would affect the availability of taxis in
Liverpool, perhaps the prices of the cabs, traffic congestion, and so on.
The fact that this led to judicial review on fairness grounds of this sort of
polycentric decision, one that would likely be classified as legislative in
modern Canadian law, was not a concern for Lord Denning. Further, he
was not concerned about the fact that at least three hundred people
would potentially be able to take advantage of the right to a hearing.
In addition, there is even a suggestion that the undertaking gave
the taxicab owners more than just procedural rights.3 4 The statement
that the "overriding public interest" must require the change suggests
that the discretion of the council to decide how many taxi licences there
should be in Liverpool had been limited by the undertaking, and that
because of it, the council was required to justify any change in policy
with a different standard (the policy had to be in the "overriding" public
interest). The impact of the application of the concepts set out in
Liverpool Taxi had the potential to be very expansive indeed.
It is worthwhile noting that this decision came in the context of a
challenge to a local council decision, since the 1970s saw British courts
taking an activist role towards reviewing the substance of local councils'
discretionary decisions. It is interesting to contrast the decision in
Liverpool Taxi with the decision several months later in Bates v. Lord
Hailsham of St. Marylebone,35 where the plaintiffs sought to challenge a
decision made by a committee (made up mostly of judges) delegated by
legislation with the power to set solicitors' fees. 36 Megarry J. held that
this decision was not subject to the duty of fairness, because it was
"legislative" and was completely different from a city council's licensing
power.37 The British courts appear to have been much more willing to
34 See P.P. Craig, "Substantive Legitimate Expectations in Domestic and Community Law"
(1996) 55 Cambridge U. 289 at 296 [hereinafter "Substantive Expectations"].
35 [1972] 3 All E.R. 1019 (Ch.D.) [hereinafter Bates].
36 It is interesting that one of the committee members was Lord Denning. The contrast in the
approach to judicial review between a situation where a committee of lawyers and judges was under
review and one where a county council's decision was being challenged is striking.
3 7 Bates, supra note 35 at 1023-24.
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apply a duty of fairness and force consultation when there were decisions
with which they disagreed, and upon bodies for whom they had less
respect. However, Liverpool Taxi, the activist decision, has become one
of the leading British legitimate expectation cases, while Bates has been
relatively ignored there (although it still stands for the fact that
legislative decisions are not generally reviewable) 38 It has, however,
been widely accepted and cited in Canada, and was cited by Estey J. in
Inuit Tapirisat as an authority for the exclusion of legislative decisions
from the duty of fairness.39 Bates was picked up by Canadian judges who
had a Diceyan, non-interventionist conception of the role of the courts
when reviewing policy decisions. Their fear of interfering with the
substance of decisions led to an overcautious reluctance to require
consultation with affected groups.
C. Mclnnes
In Mclnnes v. Onslow Fane,40 another British lower court
decision, a somewhat different spin was put on the concept than in Lord
Denning's decisions. The plaintiff had applied to the British Boxing
Board of Control for a boxing manager's licence but had been refused
without reasons or an oral hearing. Megarry V.C. distinguished three
types of cases involving licences or other cases where "rights" were not
involved. If there were a forfeiture or revocation of a licence or
membership, the plaintiff was generally entitled, it was held, to the full
range of procedures of natural justice. At the other extreme, if what was
at issue were merely an application for a benefit, there was no right to be
heard (although the decisionmaker could not act capriciously or with
bias). Megarry V.C. suggested that legitimate expectations constituted
an "intermediate category."4 1 These arose, he suggested, where
someone's licence or membership was up for renewal, or where it had
been granted informally but was waiting for confirmation. 42 Thus,
following this decision, either the nature of the interest presently held
(Mclnnes), or a representation or statement (Schmidt, Liverpool Taxi)
3 8 Small, supra note 2 at 141-43; and Administrative Law, supra note 6 at 287-88.
3 9 Inuit Tapirisat, supra note 10 at 757.
40 [1978] 3 All E.R. 211 (Ch.D.) [hereinafter Mclnnes].
41 Ibid. at 218.
42 1bid.
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could give rise to an expectation.43 It is important to note that these
"nature of the interest" situations would certainly be classified in
Canada as interests or privileges, though the British concept is more
limited.
D. Ng
The Privy Council addressed the issue of legitimate expectations
in Attorney-General of Hong Kong v. Ng Yuen Shiu.44 This was the first of
what was to become a common type of legitimate expectations case,
where the expectation was of a hearing itself. 4S The government of
Hong Kong had instituted what was known as a "reached base" policy
for illegal immigrants. If an immigrant from China reached the urban
areas of Hong Kong without being arrested the person was not deported.
However, because of an influx of illegal immigrants, the policy was
changed and it was announced that illegal immigrants from China would
begin to be deported. In response to a petition from a group of illegal
immigrants from Macau, an immigration official read a statement
outside government house which stated that illegal immigrants from that
country would "be treated in accordance with procedures for illegal
immigrants from anywhere other than China. They will be interviewed
in due course. No guarantee can be given that you may not subsequently
be removed. Each case will be treated on its merits."46 The plaintiff, an
illegal immigrant who had entered from Macau, heard a report about
this statement on television, after he had reported to an immigration
office to register. However, at his interview the next day, he was only
allowed to answer questions that were put to him, and was not allowed
to express what he felt were the humanitarian reasons he should stay.
Lord Fraser of Tullybelton held that the statement that each case
would be treated on its merits gave rise to a legitimate expectation on
the part of the plaintiff, who therefore had a right to bring forward the
reasons he should be allowed to stay. The government's promise of
treatment on the "merits" constituted a promise of a fair procedure, one
that would give Ng the opportunity to ask the immigration official to use
his or her discretion and allow him to remain in Hong Kong.
43 "Conceptual Analysis," supra note 24 at 82.
44 [1983] 2 A.C. 629 [hereinafter Ng].
45 "Conceptual Analysis," supra note 24 at 80-81.
46 Ng, supra note 44 at 635.
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A "legitimate expectation," Lord Fraser held, was of a benefit
that went "beyond legally enforceable rights." 4 7 This emphasizes the
place of the doctrine in determining whether a duty of fairness is owed.
Though he did not give a complete definition of the concept, he held
that a representation by the responsible authority was one way of
generating such an expectation. Finally, he held that if the
representation "conflicted with its duty" the body would not be held to
it.48 If the representation made was ultra vires, the body would not be
required to grant a hearing when departing from it.
Ng was also the first leading case in which the terminology used
was of fairness, rather than natural justice. Ng was not granted a formal
hearing in a case where he would have had no rights otherwise, but was
held to be entitled to put certain information before the person
interviewing him about his status. The court's interpretation of the
meaning of the representation that Ng was given both established and
defined the content of the duty of fairness owed to him. This is
particularly important, since it shows that the concept can have an
application other than as a threshold device. As I will argue later in this
article, it is in this context that the doctrine makes sense in Canada;
although it should not be used to imply a duty of fairness, it can be used
to define what fairness requires in a particular case.49
It is also worth noting that there was no requirement that Ng had
relied or taken any action on the basis of the representation that was
made to him. He went to register at the immigration office before he
heard the statement on the news. Representations give rise to legitimate
expectations, this implies, not solely because people rely on them, but
because it is an important principle that public officials should not break
their promises. Anyone who has heard or knows of a representation is
entitled, this suggests, to raise it as a legitimate expectation.
E. Khan
Ng was applied and developed in the Court of Appeal in R. v.
Secretary of State for the Home Department, ex parte Khan.50 In this case,
the Home Office had circulated a pamphlet outlining the criteria which
47 1bid. at 636.
4 81bid. at 638.
4 9 See Part VI(A), below.
50 [1985] 1 All E.R. 40 [hereinafter Khan].
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it would use when exercising its discretion to allow a child to come into
Britain for adoption. The circular also set out a procedure for gaining
approval. The plaintiff wished to adopt his relative's child, who lived in
Pakistan. He followed the steps set out in the circular. However, the
criteria set out in the circular were not applied, since those which the
Home Office normally used were quite different. Parker L.J. held that
the circular created a legitimate expectation on the part of Khan that the
criteria contained in it would be the ones applied. He was entitled to a
hearing at which he could argue why the stated criteria should be applied
to him. There is also a suggestion that the ministry could not apply
different criteria unless there was an overriding public interest that
justified changing them. Like Liverpool Taxi, Khan shows that a
representation by the decision-making body that decisions will be made
based on a certain policy can give rise to special procedural protections.
The expectation here was not of a procedure, but of the application of a
certain set of criteria, a "substantive" expectation. It is important to
note that in Canada, Khan, like Ng, would likely have been classified as
having an interest or a privilege, and it would not have been necessary to
use legitimate expectations to establish his right to make
representations. Nevertheless, a formal hearing may not have been what
the duty of fairness required.
F. GCHQ
Perhaps the most extensive application of the doctrine came in
what is now generally considered the leading case on legitimate
expectations, in the House of Lords in Council of Civil Service Unions v.
Minister for the Civil Service.5 1 The case involved employees of
Government Communications Headquarters (GCHO), which was
responsible for communications and intelligence functions for the
government. These functions were believed by the government to be
vital to national security. The several thousand people employed in this
branch of the government were represented by various national trade
unions. As part of the national unions' action against the Thatcher
government, several one-day strikes, work-to-rule campaigns, and
overtime bans were carried out by the unions working at GCHQ. As a
result of concerns about these job actions and their effect on national
security, Thatcher, who was also the minister for the civil service,
announced that the workers at GCHQ would no longer be entitled to
51 [1985] A.C. 374 (H.L.) [hereinafter GCHQ].
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belong to the national unions, and could only belong to an approved
staff association.5 2 This was done without any consultation with the
unions, despite the fact that in the past, changes in the civil servants'
conditions of employment had been the subject of consultation. The
unions argued that they were entitled to a hearing before the decision
was made.
The unions' demand that the decision be quashed was rejected,
but on the ground that the government had demonstrated that national
security was at issue. Consultation on withdrawing the unions' right to
strike would, it was held, risk provoking more strikes that would affect
the sensitive operations that took place at GCHQ. Nevertheless, the Law
Lords stated that were it not for this, the unions would have been
entitled to a hearing under the legitimate expectations doctrine. • The
legitimate expectation arose from the practice of consultation that had
existed since the establishment of GCHQ whenever changes to "conditions
of service" were made.53
Lord Diplock, in a well-known passage, held that legitimate
expectations arise when a government body deprives a person
of some benefit or advantage which either (i) he had in the past been permitted by the
decision-maker to enjoy and which he can legitimately expect to be permitted to continue
to do until there has been communicated to him some rational ground for withdrawing it
on which he has been given an opportunity to comment; or (ii) he has received assurance
from the decision-maker will not be withdrawn without giving him the opportunity of
advancing reasons for contending that they should not be withdrawn. 5 4
Although, again, a clear definition was not given, Lord Diplock
emphasized that a legitimate expectation was not simply one which a
reasonable person would entertain, but required something more to be
"legitimate." This analysis, though, suggested that the only types of
promises that could trigger the doctrine were those of hearings (as in Ng
and GCHQ), and minimized the possibility of promises of substantive
benefits giving rise to procedural rights (as, for example, in KIan). Lord
Fraser's view in the same case, however, was broader and did seem to
52 The new Labour government in Britain recently restored the right of the GCHO workers to
belong to the union of their choice. See R. Norton-Tayloe, "Sacked GCHQ Workers Elated as
Cook Decides to Right an Old Wrong" The [London] Guardian (16 May 1997) 6. However, the
government has been criticized for imposing terms on the unions that, it is argued, are almost as
restrictive as those put into place by Thatcher. See P. Beaumont, "Foreign Office Betrays GCHQ
Unions" The [London] Guardian (17 August 1997) 1.
53 Supra note 51 at 401, Lord Fraser, and at 419, Lord Roskill.
54 Ibid at 408.
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encompass the Khan situation.S As I will show, it is Lord Diplock's
narrower view, which has not been generally followed in Britain,56 that
has taken hold in Canada.
GCHQ is probably most significant for its recognition that a
regular practice of consultation could give rise to a legitimate
expectation. From a Canadian perspective, it is also worthwhile noting
that the decision at issue was made by the executive-on policy
grounds-and was almost certainly one which would not be reviewable
in Canada. Ng and GCHQ illustrate well the differences between the
Canadian and British approaches. While Ng would have been entitled
to a duty of fairness in Canada even if the government statement had not
been promulgated (since staying in the country would have been seen as
a "privilege"), the unions in GCHQ would not have been entitled to
fairness because the decision at issue was legislative, made by the
cabinet.57
Further, GCHQ shows how procedural fairness can be used to
enforce a duty on the part of government bodies to consult with certain
groups before policy decisions are made. Although at issue was a broad
decision made for reasons of public interest and policy, the unions and
their members were particularly affected by the decision. For that
reason, the government had consulted with them on previous occasions.
However, it seems improper that their right to consultation should
depend on the existence of the government's past practice. The effect
on the unions was similar to that of narrower, more individual decisions
on the person concerned, since they and their members had a particular
interest in the decision: it affected their very existence as representatives
of these workers. Unlike broad policy decisions that affect the
population at large in similar ways, where the public has the numerical
power to express its displeasure through the ballot box or other political
means, this decision affected a tiny group when compared to the general
population. In my opinion, this consideration is much more important
than the existence of the past practice.
55 C. F. Forsyth, "The Provenance and Protection of Legitimate Expectations" (1988) 47
Cambridge LJ. 238 at 246-50.
56 Ibid at 250.
57 Canadian courts have been much more hesitant than British ones to review any kind of
executive decision, whether legislative or not. See "Judicial Deference," supra note 21 at 147-53.
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G. Substantive Legitimate Expectations
Since GCHQ, there have been tentative moves in British and
Australian law towards the possibility of giving substantive protection to
legitimate expectations.5 8  Under this concept, not only will a
representation such as that in Khan or Liverpool Taxi give rise to a duty
of fairness or natural justice, it will also prevent the public body from
going back on its representation. Authority for this possibility comes
indirectly from the statements in those two cases that the representation
could not be reneged upon unless there was a hearing and it was also in
the overriding public interest. While an extensive discussion of the
merits of substantive legitimate expectations is beyond the scope of this
article, it is important to note that according substantive protection to
expectations is a much discussed issue in Britain, often through the
concept of public law estoppel. Although giving substantive effects to
legitimate expectations seems a natural evolution from giving procedural
effect to this kind of promise, this raises very different issues about the
use and fettering of discretion, and the extent to which public authorities
should be bound by their declarations of policy. In my opinion, it is
much more closely related to ideas about discretion than fairness, and
will therefore not be dealt with in detail here.
IV. BRINGING THE DOCTRINE TO CANADA
In this part, I will discuss the cases in which legitimate
expectations was first applied in Canada, examining the various
approaches courts took to the question. I will trace its application in
Canadian cases up to and including the two Supreme Court decisions
dealing with the issue. This discussion will show the confusion that
developed early in the application of the doctrine, and the many
different ways the phrase itself was used. I will emphasize that, in many
legitimate expectations cases, the doctrine was simply not necessary, and
argue that the focus on it often caused judges to ignore the flexible
character of the doctrine of fairness.
58 See, for example, "Substantive Expectations," supra note 34; "Conceptual Analysis," supra
note 24 at 87-97; and C. Lewis, Note, "Fairness, Legitimate Expectations and Estoppel" (1986) 49
Mod. L Rev. 251.
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A. Early Uses of "Legitimate Expectations"
Although legitimate expectations is generally considered to have
begun its development in Canada in the late 1980s and early 1990s, the
phrase itself appeared in some earlier decisions. In my view, the
approach in several of these judgments, where the focus was kept on the
general characteristics of the duty of fairness, was the appropriate one,
and it is unfortunate that some of these early cases were not more
closely followed in later decisions.
Several cases considered the application of the doctrine in the
sense in which it was originally developed in the British cases, as a
device for determining whether a duty of fairness was owed. In Re Webb
and Ontario Housing Corporation,59 MacKinnon A.C.J.O. addressed the
issue of whether a tenant facing eviction from public housing was
entitled to be treated by the housing corporation in accordance with the
duty of fairness. In framing the issues, he stated that the plaintiff had
argued that: "even if the Board of Directors was performing an
administrative function, on the facts of this case there was a 'duty to act
fairly,' and the appellant had a 'legitimate expectation' she would be
treated fairly and this expectation was not met."60
In dealing with this argument, however, the decision did not
refer to the English legitimate expectation cases, nor was the phrase
itself used again. Although MacKinnon A.C.J.O. held that there was a
duty of fairness, he did so by looking at the nature of the plaintiff's
interest under the then newly developing general duty of fairness. By
implication, Webb rejected the notion that a legitimate expectation was
necessary to establish a duty of fairness.61
59 (1978), 22 O.R. (2d) 257 (C.A.) [hereinafter Webb], aff'g (1977), 18 O.R. (2d) 427 (Div.
Ct.).
60 Ibid. at 260.
61 Some other cases in the 1970s addressed the issue. In Hardayal v. Minister of Manpower and
Immigration, [1976] 2 F.C. 746 (C.A.), the court held, on the basis of the doctrine, that someone
who had been given a minister's permit to remain in Canada for a certain period of time could not
have the permit withdrawn before its expiry without a hearing. This decision was overturned on
appeal on the basis that the application had been brought under s. 28 of the Federal Court Act,
R.S.C. 1970 (2d Supp.), c. 10, instead of s. 18(a): Minister of Manpower and Immigration v. Hardayal,
[1978] 1 S.C.R. 470. In Re Multi-Malls Inc. and Minister of Transportation and Communications
(1976), 14 O.R. (2d) 49 at 64-66 (C.A.) [hereinafter Multi-Malls], the court referred to Liverpool
Taxi, supra note 31, in holding the ministry to its promise that a township's official plan would be
submitted to the Ontario Municipal Board for a public hearing before it was approved. For a
review of these and other early cases dealing with "legitimate expectation fact patterns" see
MacPherson, supra note 2 at 149-50.
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The same issue, and the same result, arose in Hutfield v. Board of
Fort Saskatchewan Hospital District No. 98.62 Hutfield had requested,
but was denied hospital privileges by the defendant hospital board
without being given an oral hearing or reasons for the decision. The
board argued that Hutfield was not owed a duty of fairness, since he had
no "right" to the benefit he was seeking. He had to demonstrate a
legitimate expectation, which he could not do. McDonald J. rejected
these submissions, holding that the duty of fairness is a general one that
applies to privileges and interests whether or not there is a legitimate
expectation of receiving them. He pointed out that the board's
submissions showed:
the artificiality of the distinction drawn in the recent English cases cited, that have
pushed the frontiers of judicial review and procedural fairness outward but have limited
them on grounds ("legitimate expectation" and "slur") that do not reflect a principle that
can withstand scrutiny in the light of the object ofjudicial review by certiorari.63
McDonald J.'s judgment emphasized that the doctrine of legitimate
expectations is unnecessary at the stage of establishing whether a duty of
fairness is owed, and showed that it would restrict the concept of judicial
review if it were used in the way the British cases had applied it.64 This
decision was affirmed on different grounds in the Court of Appeal,65
although McDonald J.'s comments on the doctrine were not discussed.
However, they explain why the doctrine is, in most situations,
unnecessary in Canada and may limit the extent of the duty of fairness.
It is unfortunate that McDonald J.'s warnings were not heeded in
subsequent cases. As the above quotation suggests, the ways in which
the doctrine of legitimate expectations limits judicial review, even though
it expands it in other ways, are not consistent with the principles behind
the duty of fairness, particularly in Canadian law.
In another early case, Qudbec (Sous-Ministre du Revenu) v.
Transport Lessard (1976) Limitge,66 the Quebec Court of Appeal used
the concept to imply substantive rights into the duty of fairness, in order
to hold the minister to a "promise." The plaintiff company had received
an assurance, based on an internal directive issued by the ministry, that
62 (1986), 74 A.R. 180 (Q.B.) [hereinafter Hutfield].
63 Ibid. at 188.
64 See D.P. Jones, "A Comment on 'Legitimate Expectations' and the Duty to Give Reasons
in Administrative Law" (1987) 25 Alta. L. Rev. 512. For a somewhat different interpretation of
Hutfield than mine, see "Fair Start," supra note 2 at 277.
65 (1988), 89 A.R. 274.
66 [1985] R.D.J. 502 [hereinafter Transport Lessard].
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sales tax would not be charged on the trucks owned by another company
whose assets it was about to purchase. The ministry later changed its
interpretation of the legislation, and sales tax was charged. Relying on
Khan, the court held that the duty to act fairly could lead to substantive
results as well as procedural protections. Since the interpretation of the
law in the directive was reasonable, "un contribuable qui se fonde sur
cette directive pour r6gler sa conduite peut nourrir l'espoir l6gitime
qu'un changement post6rieur ne viendra pas perturber les d6cisions
prises en fonction d'une telle directive." 67 The legislation had to be
interpreted consistently with the earlier promise.
This use of the concept to hold the ministry to its promise about
how its discretion would be exercised was a very different use of the
doctrine than in the two previous cases. Giving substantive effects to the
legitimate expectations of the plaintiff constituted a major expansion of
the duty of fairness outside the procedural realm. Fairness, the Court of
Appeal held, could require the ministry of revenue to exercise its
discretion in a certain way. A Canadian concept of legitimate
expectations built on this principle would have dramatically expanded
the duty of fairness. 68 It seems unclear, though, why the concept of
fairness, which is focused on giving procedural rights and the right to be
heard, should be used to do something very different, preventing the
government from changing its mind about the interpretation of a tax
statute. The danger of using the same doctrine to do too many different
things is that it may not be properly adapted or specific enough to
accomplish any of them successfully. This is arguably a major problem
with legitimate expectations as it is applied in Britain. As I will argue
later, the decision to reject the idea that legitimate expectations can
require substantive results was appropriate.69
In Gaw v. Canada (Commissioner of Corrections),70 the British
legitimate expectations cases were cited when the commissioner was
held to a representation that set out the procedure that would be
6 7 1bid. at 508.
68 The only other decisions I have found in which legitimate expectations were given
substantive effects are Gingras v. Canada, [1990] 2 F.C. 68 (T.D.), varied on different grounds
(1994), 113 D.L.R. (4th) 295 (F.C.A.); and Bloomfield v. Saskatchewan (Minister of Health), [1986]
S.J. No. 675 (QL) (Q.B.). These decisions are anomalies, however, and there was no significant
move towards protecting substantive legitimate expectations in Canada. In Sturdy Truck Body
(1972) Ltd. v. M.N.R. (Customs and Excise) (1995), 95 F.T.R. 270 (F.C.T.D.), the use of legitimate
expectations to hold the government to representations it made about the application of a tax
statute was rejected; the facts of this case were very similar to those in Transport Lessard.
69 See Part VI(C), below.
70 (1986), 2 F.T.R. 122 (F.C.T.D.) [hereinafter Gaw].
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followed during an investigation of the conduct of Gaw, the district
director of the Victoria Parole Office. In response to concerns from his
lawyer, Gaw was assured that although he would not be heard at the
preliminary inquiry, if the process proceeded he would be given a formal
hearing during the second stage of the investigation. This second stage,
however, was abandoned by the Deputy Commissioner without the
formal hearing having occurred, although he agreed to meet with Gaw
before a final decision was made. Gaw argued that he was entitled to a
formal hearing. Dub6 J. concluded that "a public authority is bound by
its undertakings as to the procedure it will follow, provided this
procedure does not conflict with its duty."7 1 Although he took the
general principle from the leading British cases, it is important to note
that he did not find it necessary to determine whether the
representations came under the formal rubric of a "legitimate
expectation." The content of the duty of fairness that was otherwise
owed to Gaw was determined by holding the commissioner to his
representations. Dub6 J.'s judgment shows that the principle of holding
a body to its statements about procedure can be easily accommodated
within Canadian administrative law, without the need to determine if the
complicated conditions for legitimate expectations are fulfilled. In my
opinion, while Hutfield shows that legitimate expectations is largely
unnecessary, and could possibly have regressive effects, Gaw shows that
a wholesale importation of the doctrine is not necessary to ensure that a
body is held to its representations about the procedure it will follow.
Subsequent cases have, unfortunately, failed to recognize this.
In Penikett v. R.,72 an unsuccessful attempt was made to use
legitimate expectations to enforce past practices of consultation by the
federal government. The Yukon Government Leader, Tony Penikett,
sought to challenge the Meech Lake Accord73 agreed to by the prime
minister and the provincial premiers on the basis that the Yukon
government had not been consulted during the negotiations. 74 Relying
on GCHQ, Penikett argued that the past practice of including the
71 Ibid. at 124, citing Liverpool Taxi, supra note 31; Khan, supra note 50; Ng, supra note 44; and
Multi-Malls, supra note 61.
72 [1988] N.W.T.R. 18 (Y.T.C.A.) [hereinafter Penikett], rev'g (1987), 2 Y.R. 262 (C.A.).
73 See Constitution Amendment, 1987 (Ottawa: Government of Canada, 1987). The package
of amendments, known popularly as the Meech Lake Accord, failed to secure the required
unanimous approval of the provinces in 1990.
74 Ironically, counsel for Penikett was John Sopinka, who was shortly to rule on this question
as a Supreme Court justice. It is interesting that his judgment in CA, supra note 1, rejected
arguments similar to those made on behalf of Penikett.
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territorial governments in constitutional negotiations led to a legitimate
expectation, and therefore, fairness required that the Yukon be included
in the negotiations. The Court of Appeal held that the issues were not
justiciable, since the making of constitutional accords was part of the
process of legislation leading to the amendment of the Constitution, and
was therefore not subject to the duty of fairness.75 It did not address
whether, in this case, a legitimate expectation had arisen, although in
obiter, it suggested that executive powers were ordinarily reviewable by
the courts on the basis of fairness. 76 The court in Penikett did not
exclude the application of legitimate expectations in all cases where
decisions of a legislative nature were being made, only where they arose
in the process of making legislation. Nevertheless, this conclusion was
later to be drawn from the case by the Supreme Court of Canada.
B. Early Influential Cases
The most important and most often cited early Canadian case is
Bendahmane v. Canada (Minister of Employment and Immigration). 77
Bendahmane had come to Canada on a visitor's visa, but was denied
entry to Canada by an immigration officer who believed he was not a
"genuine visitor." An inquiry confirmed this finding, which
Bendahmane appealed. As he was waiting for the appeal to be heard, a
program was announced to clear the backlog of refugee claimants, under
which special criteria would be used to consider their applications.
Bendahmane obtained a form letter stating that those waiting for an
inquiry could apply for refugee status before a certain date and be
considered under this program. Although these criteria did not apply to
the plaintiff (since an inquiry had already been held in his case), he
applied for refugee status. He was then sent a letter stating that he did
not qualify for the backlog reduction program, but that his "claim for
refugee status will continue to be considered in the usual way." 78 The
minister later refused to consider his application, however, since under
the statute refugee claims could normally only be made before the
inquiry was held. The last sentence of the letter did not in fact apply to
his case, and the information in it was wrong. However, Bendahmane
75 Penikett, supra note 72 at 30-31.
76 Ibi at 27-29.
77 [1989] 3 F.C. 16 (C.A.) [hereinafter Bendahmane].
78 Ibid. at 22.
1997]
OSGOODE HALL LAW JOURNAL
argued that this representation created a legitimate expectation that his
application would be handled as other applications were, and that he
was therefore entitled to the full hearing that other claimants (who had
made the request at the proper time) received.
The Federal Court of Appeal, in large part, accepted this
argument. Hugessen J.A., writing for the majority, held that the minister
had not fulfilled the duty to act fairly. He pointed out that although the
statute set out the procedure for the hearing of refugee claims (including
the fact that they had to be filed before the inquiry was held), the
minister retained a discretion to hear them at other times.7 9 However,
he held that the more general question of whether the duty of fairness
applied to someone who claimed refugee status outside the normal time
limit did not arise in this case.80 He held, after citing Ng, that the
minister was obliged to consider Bendahmane's application, since the
representations in the letter gave rise to an expectation that his
application would be considered. Since the representation did not
conflict with the minister's statutory duty, it had to be honoured, and an
order was made that the minister consider the case "in accordance with
the rules of fairness and the principles of fundamental justice."81
Marceau J.A. dissented. He held that this was not a proper case
for legitimate expectations, since the applicant, in trying to force the
minister to uphold his promise, was asking the court for substantive,
rather than procedural relief. He disagreed With the majority's
interpretation of the statute, and held that the minister was not "entirely
free" to disregard the procedure set out in it. He also held that
Bendahmane should have realized that the letter did not apply to
someone in his position, so no legitimate expectation arose.82
This case shows several important issues that recur in the
Canadian application of legitimate expectations. The majority, in my
view, used the concept to avoid deciding whether a duty of fairness was
owed in ordinary circumstances to someone who made an application
for refugee status outside the statutory procedure. Were legitimate
expectations not applied, the court would have had to decide whether,
given that the statute permitted the minister to make a decision on a
refugee application outside the regular time frame, this exercise of
discretion attracted the principles of fairness. It would have been
79 Ibid. at 31-32.
80 IbM. at 30.
81 Ibi. at 33.
82 Ibi. at 26.
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difficult for the court to hold that such a decision was not a
determination of a right, interest, or privilege, so fairness should have
applied in any case. The doctrine enabled the court to avoid making a
decision that would have required the minister to consider all
applications made outside the statutory procedure. Although the
concept is supposed to lead to an expansion of the duty of fairness, this
decision was used to avoid a broad interpretation of the duty. A
subsequent plaintiff in Bendahmane's position who makes an application
outside the time frame may well be required to show a legitimate
expectation. Legitimate expectations was used to find that a duty
existed, but this was unnecessary. As would occur in many later cases,
the dispute between the majority and dissent over issues such as whether
the expectation was substantive or procedural, and whether the
expectation was "legitimate" obscured the real issues about when
fairness applies to exercises of discretion, and how the existence of
another procedure affects this. What the letter should have been used
for, I believe, is to determine what the content of the duty should
be-perhaps fairness would normally only require minimal procedures if
an application was made outside the normal time frame, but the letter
meant that Bendahmane was entitled to the same procedure as someone
who applied within this period.
Legitimate expectations arose in yet another context in Sunshine
Coast Parents for French v. School District No. 46.83 In this case, a group
of parents challenged the school board's decision to eliminate its French
immersion program, which began at grade one, and replace it with one
beginning in grade four. The parents were not consulted prior to the
decision, and argued that the duty of fairness had not been complied
with, since the board had a policy requiring that they be consulted.
Spencer J. acknowledged that legitimate expectations formed part of
Canadian law, but implied that a legitimate expectation could only arise
from a promise or practice of consultation. However, he went on to hold
that the school board was making a legislative decision, and that under
the principles in Inuit Tapirisat, fairness did not apply to legislative
functions. He rejected the plaintiffs' argument that legitimate
expectations constituted a general exception to the rule preventing
judicial review of legislative functions. The plaintiffs' proper course of
action, he held, "was to vote [the board's] members out of office at the
first opportunity."84
83 (1990), 49 B.C.L.R. (2d) 252 (S.C.) [hereinafter Sunshine Coast].
84 1bid. at 258.
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Nevertheless, he went on to consider the fact that the board had
previously passed a policy which included among its provisions a
responsibility to invite comment from those particularly affected by a
proposal. He held that legitimate expectations would force a body
exercising a legislative function to follow its own procedures while they
were in effect.S5 Although the board could have avoided this requirement
by suspending the policy and then passing the motion, it was bound by
the policy while it was in effect. However, the plaintiffs did not know of
the policy, so they could not have relied on it and therefore, in the
judge's view, had no legitimate expectation. The plaintiffs' motion was
therefore dismissed.
Again, the focus on legitimate expectations and on the board's
policy obscured what, in my view, should have been the important issues.
The parents of children attending the French immersion classes had a
special interest in the question of the grade levels at which they would be
offered. Even if the decision was properly classified as legislative (which
is debatable), it is the nature of the parents' interest that should have
given them rights to participate in the decision. While a broader
conception of legitimate expectations that focused on "nature of the
interest" claims might have taken this into account, Spencer J.'s narrow
conception of legitimate expectations and the exclusion of judicial
review of legislative functions prevented this.86 The doctrine of
legitimate expectations simply does not seem an appropriate way to
determine whether these parents had a right to be heard. The fact is
that the group of parents who had children in French immersion classes
would probably not have the political power to "vote the board members
out of office" as suggested by Spencer J. The majority of voters in the
school district, if their children were not in French immersion, would
likely not be much concerned about this decision. In my view, it is this
fact, rather than the existence of some form of promise, that should be at
the centre of the debate. Consultation with the parents was necessary to
ensure that their views were at least taken into account. Focusing on the
current definition of legitimate expectations obscured the real reasons
consultation was needed.
85 Ibid. at 260.
86 For a somewhat different view of this case, see D.J. Mullan, "Confining the Reach of
Legitimate Expectations--Case Comment: Sunshine Coast Parents for French v. School District No.
46 (Sunshine Coast)" (1991) 44 Admin. LR. 245 [hereinafter "Confining the Reach"].
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C. Supreme Court Decisions
In 1990, the Supreme Court first ruled on the issue of legitimate
expectations in Old St. Boniface,8 7 but only in a brief paragraph at the
end of the judgment. The plaintiffs were opposed to the rezoning of an
area of Winnipeg. Among several other arguments, the association
submitted that city councillors had promised that it would be consulted
as part of the process of developing a plan for the area, and that this
would occur before the redevelopment to which the group was opposed.
This, it argued, created a legitimate expectation, preventing the city from
approving the rezoning without the consultation taking place.
Although this was the first time the Court had addressed this
emerging issue, Sopinka J.'s judgment did not refer to many of the
leading British cases (he referred only to GCHQ and Ng), nor did it review
any of the above Canadian cases other than Gaw. Nevertheless, Sopinka
J., in obiter, confirmed the doctrine's place in Canadian law and
proceeded to give a basic definition of it. He held:
The principle developed in these cases is simply an extension of the rules of natural
justice and procedural fairness. It affords a party affected by the decision of a public
official an opportunity to make representations in circumstances where there otherwise
would be no such opportunity. The court supplies the omission where, based on the
conduct of the public official, a party has been led to believe that his or her rights would
not be affected without consultation. 88
Sopinka J. went on to hold, however, that since the City of
WinnipegAct89 set out a procedure for consultation in the planning and
zoning process, it was not appropriate for the Court to apply the
doctrine even if the councillors' statements had given rise to legitimate
expectations on the part of the residents' association. The residents had
their chance under the procedure set out in the statute, he argued, to
make representations to a committee before the rezoning decision was
made (although this admittedly fell short of what they were promised).
The legitimate expectations doctrine, he held, "would not justify this
Court in mounting onto the elaborate statutory scheme yet another
process of consultation." 90
Although this judgment purported to apply the British and
Canadian cases, it in fact severely restricted the doctrine, and, in my
8 7 Supra note 1.
88 Ibid. at 1204.
89 S.M. 1971, c. 105.
90 Old St. Boniface, supra note 1 at 1204.
1997]
OSGOODE HALL LAW JOURNAL
opinion, led to even more confusion. This decision imported the
doctrine but without even considering its place in the different Canadian
context. Especially perplexing was Sopinka J.'s statement that legitimate
expectations is an extension of the duty of fairness and that it gives the
right to "make representations" where there would otherwise be no
right. This implies that legitimate expectations is a threshold device, that
it leads to the implication of a duty of fairness. However, the judgment
does not say how the duty of fairness is extended, or in what situations
legitimate expectations leads to a duty of fairness where there would
otherwise be none. Though the doctrine triggers the duty of fairness in
Britain, and Sopinka J.'s statement would be correct there, the broad
conception of fairness in Canada makes it unnecessary to extend the
duty to situations not covering rights or interests. The only significant
possibility for extension of the duty is into review of decisions that would
otherwise be considered legislative.91 Because Sopinka J. talked about
an opportunity to make representations in circumstances "where
otherwise there would be no such opportunity," 92 he also seemed to rule
out the possibility that legitimate expectations could be used to define
the content of the duty of fairness in cases where the duty would exist
under the general test.
The statement that the effect of the doctrine is an opportunity to
"make representations" seemed to confirm that in Canada there are no
substantive effects to the doctrine. Presumably, then, the use of the
doctrine to give a "substantive content" to the duty of fairness in
Transport Lessard was not appropriate. Canada was not to follow Britain
down the road to using the doctrine as a device to hold governments to
the substantive elements of their promises.93
Sopinka J.'s wording suggests that legitimate expectations only
arise from conduct giving rise to an expectation of consultation. This
rules out two of the categories which in Britain can give rise to a
legitimate expectation-those arising from the nature of the interest
itself, as in Mclnnes, and the promise of a substantive benefit, as in
Khan. Although the expectation was of consultation in the two cases
referred to by Sopinka J., the doctrine itself protects other, broader
conceptions of expectations. Lord Diplock's erroneous restriction of the
91 J.M. Evans et aL, Administrative Law: Cases, Text, and Materials, 4th ed. (Toronto: Emond
Montgomery, 1995) at 134-35.
9 2 Ibid.
93 Mullan, however, believes that this judgment did leave open the possibility of a substantive
dimension to legitimate expectations: see "Fair Start," supra note 2 at 273.
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concept to promises of procedure in GCHQ, 9 4 which has not been
followed in Britain, was nevertheless picked up by Sopinka J. because of
the limited sources upon which he relied.
Although the residents were heard in accordance with the
procedure in the statute, Sopinka J. failed to address directly the issues
that had arisen in a slightly different context in Bendahmane. In that
judgment, it was held that as long as the undertaking is not contrary to
what is provided for in the statute, the body will be held to it, even if the
statute itself sets out a different procedure. The judgment in Old St.
Boniface suggested, instead, that if there is any consultation provided for
in the statute, a judge has the option to decline to protect the legitimate
expectation. This seems to contradict one of the principles behind the
legitimate expectations doctrine-that public officials should be held to
their promises, even if what is promised is not required by legislation.
Unless the statute specifically prohibits the body from carrying out
consultations in addition to what the statute requires, there appears to
me no reason to go against this principle. Again, the doctrine was
restricted, but without real reasons being given for that decision.
Old St. Boniface left a seriously limited doctrine of legitimate
expectations in place in Canada, and Sopinka J.'s description of the
doctrine did not take into account the differences in Canadian and
British administrative law. It was difficult to see from this case how the
doctrine would apply in Canadian law, unless it constituted an exception
to the rule that legislative decisions do not attract a duty of fairness.
However, this possibility was eliminated, and the doctrine was
even further limited eight months later with the Court's decision in the
CAP case. 95 This case reached the Supreme Court after the British
Columbia Court of Appeal had delivered a judgment 96 which expanded
the reach of the doctrine considerably. Under the Canada Assistance
Plan,97 the minister of national health and welfare was authorized to
enter into agreements with the provinces under which the federal
government would pay fifty per cent of the costs of social assistance in
the province. Another section of the legislation provided that the
agreement was in effect until it was terminated by mutual agreement or
with one year's notice by either party.98 The notice provisions were also
94 See supra notes 54-56 and accompanying text.
95 Supra note 1.
96 Reference Re Constitutional Question Act (British Columbia) (1990), 71 D.L.R. (4th) 99.
9 7 R.S.C. 1985, c. C-1.
98 idR, s. 8(2).
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included in the agreement. British Columbia entered into an agreement
under the Plan, as did all other provinces. In its budget speech, the
federal government announced that contributions to British Columbia,
Alberta, and Ontario would be reduced and determined under a
different formula. This change was to take place right away, and was
implemented through a change in the legislation.99
The government of British Columbia argued, and it was accepted
by the Court of Appeal, that the agreement gave the provincial
government a legitimate expectation that it would be consulted and its
consent would be obtained before changes were made to the agreement,
unless the one year's notice was given. Although the Court of Appeal
recognized that parliamentary sovereignty prevented the court from
sanctioning Parliament's action, it held that the doctrine of legitimate
expectations prevented the executive from introducing the legislation
into Parliament without the required consent from the British Columbia
government. Thus, while interference in the legislative process was not
permissible, the executive was constrained by its undertaking from
introducing legislation that went against the expectation.
The Court of Appeal decision was overturned by a unanimous
Supreme Court, in a decision also written by Sopinka J. First, he held
that the Court of Appeal's holding that introducing the legislation
required the consent of British Columbia was an improper use of the
legitimate expectation doctrine to create substantive rights. The
judgment confirmed that the duty of fairness cannot impose constraints
on decision-making bodies except in the procedures they follow. He
wrote:
It was held by the majority of the court below ... that the federal government acted
illegally in invoking the power of Parliament to amend the plan without obtaining the
consent of British Columbia. ... This must be contrasted with a claim that there was a
legitimate expectation that the federal government would not act without consulting
British Columbia. If the doctrine of legitimate expectations required consent, and not
merely consultation, then it would be the source of substantive rights; in this case, a
substantive right to veto proposed federal legislation. 100
Again, Sopinka J. did not seem to recognize the possibility that a
legitimate expectation of a substantive result might lead to procedural
protection. He did not address the possibility that, as in Khan, British
Columbia's legitimate expectation of its consent being required (a
substantive expectation) could give rise to the right to be consulted
before the commitment to obtain that consent was reneged upon (a
99 Government Expenditures RestraintAct, S.C. 1991, c. 9, s. 2.
100 cAp, supra note 1 at 557 [emphasis in original].
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procedural protection). His judgment here, as in Old St. Boniface, does
seem to imply that only a legitimate expectation that a certain procedure
will be followed gives rise to procedural protection.101 This seems
counter-intuitive. A promise that a certain result will follow is stronger
and more reassuring than a promise that a certain procedure will be
accorded. However, under Sopinka J.'s approach the former would lead
to no protection under the doctrine of legitimate expectations, while the
latter would.
Sopinka J. went on to hold that the doctrine was also not
applicable because of the nature of the Minister's decision that was
being challenged-the introduction of a bill into Parliament. The
introduction of legislation, he held, was a fundamental part of the
legislative process, and using the doctrine of legitimate expectations to
restrict it would interfere with Parliamentary sovereignty. Sopinka J.
went further, however, and also held that "the rules governing
procedural fairness do not apply to a body exercising purely legislative
functions."102
Citing Inuit Tapirisat, Martineau v. Matsqui Disciplinary Board,10 3
and Penikett, the judgment seemed to reject the argument (as put
forward, for example, by the plaintiffs in Sunshine Coast) that legitimate
expectations constituted an exception to the rule that legislative
functions were not reviewable. However, this is not entirely clear, since
Sopinka J. was dealing with a case in which part of the Parliamentary
legislative process was being challenged. He directed most of his
discussion to this question, although the citations suggest that this
analysis also applied to legislative functions as defined in Inuit Tapirisat
and Knight, and this is how subsequent cases have interpreted the
decision. Although in the particular context of this decision the formal
legislative process was at issue, Sopinka J.'s judgment appeared to close
the door on the possibility of legitimate expectations being the exception
to the rule that legislative decisions lead to no duty of fairness.104 His
holding that the doctrine applies only to administrative, not legislative
functions and his reference to cases like Inuit Tapirisat that define when
a general duty of fairness exists, seem to directly contradict his holding
in Old St. Boniface that the purpose of legitimate expectations is to
expand the duty of fairness to situations where it would otherwise not be
101 Cartier, supra note 2 at 108-09.
102 CAP, supra note 1 at 558.
103 [1980] 1 S.C.R. 602 [hereinafter Martineau].
104 "Fair Start," supra note 2 at 281-83.
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applicable. Sopinka J. did not even consider whether applying the duty
of fairness to legislative functions might be a possible "extension" of the
duty of fairness.
Most striking about this further restriction to the application of
legitimate expectations is that it means that GCHQ, and perhaps Liverpool
Taxi would have been decided differently in Canada under the principles
set out in the two Supreme Court decisions.105 GCHQ was a case where
the decision was "purely ministerial," made "on broad grounds of public
policy," two of the criteria cited by Sopinka J. as indicators that a
decision is legislative and therefore not reviewable. 106 Similarly,
Liverpool Taxi was a case where the city council was making broad
decisions about the appropriate number of licences in the city, rather
than about the licence of an individual taxi owner or taxi company.
Although Lord Denning classified this decision as "administrative,"107
he was referring to it as administrative in the sense of not being judicial
or quasi-judicial. In Old St. Boniface, Sopinka J. had held that conduct
on the part of the authority that led the plaintiff to expect a certain
procedure was necessary to trigger the doctrine, thereby eliminating the
McInnes and Khan situations. It appears that the only leading British
case that would- fall under the Canadian doctrine of legitimate
expectations would be Ng. While these Supreme Court cases purported
to apply the British doctrine, their description of its scope severely
restricted it.
The two Supreme Court decisions confirmed the application of
the British doctrine in Canadian cases but limited it and left several
confusions in its application by not addressing its role in Canadian law.
It seemed apparent that a legitimate expectation would not be protected
if the function being carried out was a legislative one as defined in Inuit
Tapirisat. If the function was an administrative one, the plaintiff had to
show conduct of the body which gave rise to an expectation that a certain
procedure would be followed; an expectation of substantive results
would not give rise to special procedural protection. Finally, there was
no explanation of how legitimate expectations related to the general
duty of fairness or what its effects were.
105 See "Confining the Reach," supra note 86 at 250-51.
106 cAp, supra note 1 at 558-59, citing Martineau, supra note 103 at 628, Dickson J. (as he then
was).
107Liverpool Taxi, supra note 31 at 308.
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V. THE DOCTRINE OF LEGITIMATE
EXPECTATIONS SINCE CAP
Having reviewed the pioneering and leading cases, this part will
examine the explosion of legitimate expectation cases that have arisen
since the Supreme Court addressed the issue. I will show that these
decisions have given rise to further confusion, and that the application of
this doctrine by the courts is far from uniform. These cases also show
the kinds of problems to which administrative law must adjust itself in
reformulating the doctrine and giving it a clear definition. The
discussion will be organized around the issues that arise at different
stages of the analysis.
A. The Place of the Doctrine Relative to the Duty of Fairness
Because of the lack of clarity in the Supreme Court decisions
about exactly what its technical function was, there is a good deal of
confusion about the effect and place of the doctrine. In general, two
approaches have been taken to this question: some judgments seem to
presume that legitimate expectations defines the content of the duty of
fairness; others treat legitimate expectations as a separate ground of
review, in addition to fairness.
1. Defining the duty of fairness
In many cases, courts have recognized that the doctrine applies
in situations where the duty of fairness exists anyway, and have used the
doctrine to define the content of that duty, despite the confusion in the
Supreme Court judgments. In my opinion, this use of legitimate
expectations to hold bodies to the procedure that they have stated they
would follow is the best approach. In Qi v. Canada (Minister of
Citizenship and Immigration),108 for example, the applicants were called
to an interview with an immigration officer to determine whether they
were unlawfully in Canada, after they neglected to renew their visitors'
visas. In a letter advising them of the interview, they were told they
could have counsel present. However, their representative, although
allowed to attend, was not permitted to speak or make representations
at the interview. The court held that implicit in the statement that
108 (1995), 33 Imm. L.R. (2d) 57 (F.C.T.D.) [hereinafter Qi].
1997]
OSGOODE HALL LAW JOURNAL
counsel could be present was a promise that the representative could
participate in the interview. Since the minister's letter gave rise to a
legitimate expectation that counsel could participate, the duty of fairness
required that the promise be acted upon. "After issuing the invitation to
have counsel present, to then deny the applicants' representative the
right to take part in the interview is a breach of natural justice," Reed J.
held.109 This case emphasizes why using the doctrine to define the
content of the duty of fairness should lead to more than just a right to
make "representations" as stated by Sopinka J. in Old St. Boniface; here
it was a right to counsel that was at issue.
A similar result was reached in Mercier-Niron v. Canada
(Minister of National Health and Welfare),110 where the applicant had
applied for compensation under a government program for Thalidomide
victims. The documentation and application form indicated that she had
the right to a hearing to determine her eligibility. She was denied a
hearing, and the minister's office said that the hearing was offered only
to determine the level of assistance, not eligibility for the program, and
that the information it had promulgated was wrong. It was held,
however, that having been promised a hearing in the documentation, she
had to be given one. These two cases outline clearly, I believe, that a
representation stating that certain procedures will be followed can be
used in a straightforward manner to determine exactly what fairness
requires in particular cases.111 A complicated doctrine of legitimate
expectations is unnecessary, and applying the principle as these cases did
would simplify it and avoid the possible regressive effects on the duty of
fairness.
It is worth noting one other case where the doctrine was applied
in a similar way when the promise was of a substantive result. In Canada
(A. G.) v. Canada (Human Rights Tribunal),1)2 the content of the duty of
fairness was strengthened because of substantive promises made to the
plaintiff. This case arose after the Canada Human Rights Commission
had received several complaints that the Family Allowances Act113 and
109 Ibid. at 61.
110 [1995] F.C.J. No. 1024 (QL) (T.D.) [hereinafter Mercier-Nlron].
111 See also Demirtas v. Canada, [1991] 3 F.C. 489 (T.D.). The approach I am advocating here
was explicitly rejected in Bow Valley Naturalists' Society v. Alberta (Minister of Environmental
Protection) (1995); 177 A.R. 161 (Q.B.), where, relying on Old St. Boniface, supra note 1, it was held
that the doctrine could only be used as a threshold device, not to define what fairness required.
112 (1994), 76 F.T.R. 1 (F.C.T.D.) [hereinafter FamilyAllowance].
113 R.S.C. 1985, c. F-1.
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Family Allowances Regulations1 14 discriminated on the basis of sex
because they were payable only to the female parent (unless the male
parent had sole custody or in exceptional circumstances). As part of a
settlement of one of the early complaints, the commission and the
department agreed that changes would be made to the program to allow
the male parent to receive the family allowance cheque in more
situations, and the complaint was not sent to a tribunal. Nevertheless,
the commission later referred several similar complaints to a human
rights tribunal.
Reed J. held that the earlier settlement had created a legitimate
expectation that later complaints about the same legislation would not
proceed.115 The minister responsible for the legislation was entitled to
be consulted and given reasons why the earlier settlement was being
rejected before the complaints were sent to the tribunal. This, it is
important to note, is notwithstanding the fact that full trial-type
procedures would have been accorded when the merits of the case were
decided at the tribunal level.This case shows that it is also possible to use the existence of a
legitimate expectation of substantive criteria or a substantive result to
determine the content of the duty of fairness, even though this possibility
has not found favour with the Supreme Court. Although in this case the
commission was not held to its representation, the settlement was an
important factor in determining what fairness required. Again, I think
Reed J.'s reasoning makes sense. The commission's representation to
the minister that the complaint was settled was as important as if it had
been a promise that the minister would be consulted or given reasons
before a subsequent complaint was sent to a tribunal. Although Reed J.
did not give substantive effects to the representation (the commission
could refer the complaints to the tribunal), she did hold that it meant
that fairness required certain procedures that would not otherwise have
been necessary (giving reasons and consulting before it was referred
there). This approach combines well the principle that promises made
by public bodies are important and should not be broken with the broad
and flexible characteristics of the duty of fairness and its focus on
procedural rights and protections.
114 C.R.C. 1978, c. 642
115 Family Allowance, supra note 112 at 12.
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2. A separate ground of review
Other cases seem to see legitimate expectations as something
independent from the general conception of fairness, that can also lead
to judicial review. This is similar to the vision of legitimate expectations
in Bendahmane; legitimate expectations can trigger procedural rights
just as the existence of a right, privilege, or interest can. Under this
approach, whether fairness has been met is considered separately from
whether a legitimate expectation claim has been made out.11 6 Although,
essentially, legitimate expectations as used in these cases would have the
same effect as using them to determine the content of the duty of
fairness, it seems to me that this approach ignores the flexible,
circumstance-based determination of the content of the duty of fairness,
and the broad conditions in which the threshold for the duty is met.
Legitimate expectations should be seen as a part of fairness, rather than
as an "add-on" to it. When, as in these cases, it is used as a threshold
concept, the danger arises that the general duty of fairness will be
restricted and that interests and privileges will be defined more
narrowly.
This approach does, however, lead to the possibility that there
may be situations in which review could take place even if there are no
rights, interests, or privileges at stake, and the doctrine could expand the
duty of fairness as suggested in Old St. Boniface. In Pharmaceutical
Manufacturers'Association of Canada v. British Columbia (A. G.),117 the
plaintiff objected to the fact that pharmaceutical companies were not
consulted prior to the British Columbia government's announcement of
a change in the percentage of drug costs that would be covered by the
government-funded Pharmacare program. The plaintiffs argued that
they were entitled to be consulted either because they had an interest in
the decision (it would affect their sales and profits in the province) or
because they had a legitimate expectation of consultation. The
legitimate expectation was based on the fact that the province's practice
in the past had been to consult manufacturers before the province added
or removed their products from the list of drugs covered under the
programme. Edwards J. determined that the applicants did not have a
sufficient interest, or as he called it, "substantive right," to be entitled to
116 See, for example, Trofimenkoff v. Saskatchewan (Minister of Education) (1991), 92 Sask R.
229 (Q.B.), aff'd (1991), 97 Sask. R. 161 (C.A.); and Saskatchewan Government Employees Union v.
Saskatchewan (1991), 96 Sask R. 22 (Q.B.) [hereinafter sGEu].
117 (1996), 25 B.C.L.R. (3d) 82 (S.C.) [hereinafter Pharmaceutical Manufacturers].
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a duty of fairness, because the manufacturers were gaining only an
indirect benefit by having their products subsidized under the
program.118 He then went on to consider whether the manufacturers
could nevertheless be entitled to fairness since they had a legitimate
expectation of being consulted. He held that legitimate expectations
could not apply in this case since the decisions about the amount of the
subsidy under the Pharmacare program were legislative ones, and since
the practice of consultation over listing or delisting of individual drugs
did not give rise to a legitimate expectation of consultation when
broader decisions about the level of benefits were being made.11 9
Nevertheless, Edwards J.'s decision raises the possibility that the
doctrine's function in Canada is to lead to procedural protections even
when no rights, privileges, or interests of the applicant are at issue.
Under this conception, in the right circumstances, a legitimate
expectation can give someone the right to be heard before a decision is
made, even if it has only tangential effects on them.12 0 I think that
applying legitimate expectations as in Pharmaceutical Manufacturers
would lead to a narrow application of legitimate expectations, only in
exceptional and inappropriate circumstances. If there were no interest
or privilege at issue, why should the companies have been heard, even if
there had been a practice of consulting them or the decision was not
legislative? Giving someone a right to be heard in situations where their
own interests are not at stake, but those of others are, is inconsistent
with the notion that the purpose of the duty of fairness is to give citizens
a right to be consulted before decisions affecting them are made. If
Edwards J.'s holding that the plaintiff had no interest in the decision was
the correct one, I believe the analysis should have stopped there.
Adding legitimate expectations to the list of rights, interests, and
privileges would lead either to a narrowing of the definition of these
concepts, or to judicial review in inappropriate situations. These
problems add to the reasons why it is desirable to see the function of
118 Ibid. at 120.
119 Ibid. at 120-21.
120 In another case, Richmond Cabs Ltd. v. British Columbia (Motor Carrier Commission)
(1992), 69 B.C.L.R. (2d) 149 (S.C.) [hereinafter Richmond Cabs], a broader conception of
"interests" was used. In this case, the plaintiffs were given assurances that they would be heard
before the licence conditions of another cab company were extended. Shaw J. held, at 159-63, that
Richmond Cabs had a sufficient interest in the licensing, since its profits and the value of its licences
would be affected by the other company's licence, and the extension would lead to competition for
Richmond Cabs. Using this conception of "interests," it seems unlikely that there are many
situations where someone could have a legitimate expectation but would not be accorded a duty of
fairness under the general doctrine as having an interest or privilege.
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legitimate expectations as a doctrine that defines what fairness requires
in a particular case, rather than one that triggers a duty where none
would otherwise exist.
B. The Threshold:Administrative and Not Legislative
All the cases that I have found have accepted that Sopinka J.'s
judgment in CAP excluded review of legislative decisions under the
legitimate expectations doctrine. Therefore, a preliminary question that
must be asked in legitimate expectations cases, as in other fairness cases,
is whether the function being exercised is legislative or administrative.
The legitimate expectations argument is often rejected because the
function at issue is held to be legislative. This is frequently because the
legitimate expectations doctrine has been used by plaintiffs to try to
ensure that groups or individuals with a special interest in policy
decisions are consulted. Although these cases show the need to promote
consultation and participation of groups in these decisions, I think they
also show that the legitimate expectations doctrine is not the best way to
do so.
In some cases, plaintiffs have attempted to use the concept to
challenge cabinet decisions that are quite clearly policy-based, but where
the plaintiffs had a special interest in the outcome of the decision. For
example, in Hamilton-Wentworth (Regional Municipality) v. Ontario
(Minister of Transportation),121 the municipality challenged a decision of
the provincial government to withdraw funding for a section of new
expressway. The funding had been promised by the previous
government (although only on an "annual review basis"), but the new
New Democratic Party government felt the expressway would be
destructive to the environment. The municipality had made plans and
spent money in the belief that it would get funding. The Divisional
Court, however, held that as this was a legislative decision made on
policy grounds, fairness did not apply. Nevertheless, I think that it is
important to consider whether the municipal government was providing
funding, and it had made spending and other decisions on the basis of
the representation, the provincial government should have been obliged
to consult it in some way before making the decision to withdraw its
support. At the very least, perhaps the municipality should have been
able to point out to the provincial government how the change in plans
(as opposed to an original spending or policy decision) would affect it,
121 (1991), 2 O.R. (3d) 716 (Div. Ct.) [hereinafter Hamilton-Wentworth].
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despite the fact that this was a policy decision. It is the municipality's
special interest, not the existence of the representation, that should be
most important in deciding its right to be heard. Although in this case
the special interest arose because of the representation, this will not
always be the case.
Other cases which seem to be clearly legislative, and where the
application of the doctrine was rejected, include decisions of municipal
councils to raise taxes 22 and privatize a municipally-owned utility.123
These two cases show another reason why piggybacking onto legitimate
expectations is an inappropriate way to expand the duty of fairness into
legislative decisions. The above decisions affected all citizens in the city
of Edmonton. As a group, they did have the power in a municipal
election to vote the councillors out of office. Using legitimate
expectations as the threshold when legislative decisions were at issue
would give these citizens a right to be consulted (if it were held there was
a representation). However, those who were more politically powerless,
but who had not been given a representation, would have no
consultation rights. In my view, it is in the latter situation where the law
should step in to enforce consultation.
In other cases, however, the question of whether a decision is
legislative is not so clear. In British Columbia and Yukon Hotels'Assn. v.
British Columbia (Liquor Distribution Branch),124 the hotel association
challenged the failure of the liquor distribution branch to consult it or its
members before the decision to order a mandatory "keg deposit system"
on containers of draught beer. This system was implemented at the
request of the province's brewers. This decision was classified as
legislative because of its broad effects, and the fact that, according to the
judge, it was made on the basis of the "public interest." Some courts
have been more generous to plaintiffs in their interpretation of what is
administrative, particularly in the case of policy decisions to cut back or
withdraw benefits. While it was held in Sunshine Coast125 that the
cancellation of a French immersion program was a legislative decision,
in Furey v. Conception Bay Centre Roman Catholic School Board126 the
122 Lehndorff United Properties (Canada) v. Edmonton (City of) (1994), 157 A.R. 169 (C.A.),
affg (1993), 146 A.R. 37 (Q.B.).
123 Edmonton Telephones Corp. v. Stephenson (1994), 160 A.R. 352 (Q.B.) [hereinafter
Edmonton Telephones], affd on different grounds (1994), 162 A.R. 139 (C.A.).
124 [1997] B.CJ. No. 305 (QL) (S.C.) [hereinafter B.C. and Yukon Hotels'Association].
125 Supra note 83.
126 (1993), 104 D.L.R. (4th) 455 at 465-66 (Nfld. C.A.) [hereinafter Furey].
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Newfoundland Court of Appeal held that the closing of a school was an
administrative function. Most cases appear to be more consistent with
the latter approach. The closing of a hospital,)27 the decision to revoke
the granting of bilingual status to a Quebec town,128 and the closing of a
rural post officel 29 have all been held to be administrative decisions
reviewable under the legitimate expectations doctrine. A relatively
broad conception of what is administrative is leading, in general, to a
wide range of situations in which the doctrine can apply.130 This
expansion, however, should often make the doctrine of legitimate
expectations unnecessary for the implication of a duty of fairness. 31 If
these are administrative decisions, people must be consulted whether or
not there is a representation.
Furey demonstrates, though, that relying on the doctrine of
legitimate expectations, even if the power at issue is classified as
administrative, may cause the general duty of fairness to be ignored.
The board voted to close the school in question in 1991. Although
discussions and consultation with the parents had taken place during
earlier discussions about a school closing and consolidation two years
earlier, there was no notice to or consultation with parents before the
1991 decision was made. The applicants argued that board statements
had given rise to a legitimate expectation that the board would follow
suggested ministry of education guidelines that required notice to and
consultation of parents before schools were closed. This was rejected by
Cameron J.A., writing for the court, on the basis that the applicants did
not believe the guidelines were binding on the board32 However, there
was no discussion about whether the general duty of fairness required
consultation with the parents in these circumstances. If the school
closing was truly an administrative decision, affecting the interests or
privileges of the parents (or children), the court should have determined
1 2 7 Hpital Reine Elizabeth v. Quebec (ministre de la Sant et des Services sociaux), [1996] A.Q.
No. 3406 (QL) (CA.).
128 Alliance for Language Communities in QuebeclAlliance pour les Communautis v. Quebec
(A.G.) (1990), 49 Admin. LR. 243 (Que. Sup. Ct.) [hereinafter Alliance for Language].
129 Rural Dignity of Canada v. Canada Post Corporation (1991), 40 F.T.R. 255 (F.C.T.D.)
[hereinafter Rural Dignity], aff'd (1992), 139 N.R. 203 (F.C.A.).
130 However, Alliance for Language is the only one of the above cases where it was held that
the conditions for the doctrine were met.
131 As outlined in Part VI, below, I believe that the administrative/legislative distinction
should become unimportant in many cases, but if this does not happen, a more generous definition
of "administrative" would be a positive development.
132 See my discussion of this aspect of the case below, text accompanying note 138, infra.
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the content of the duty of fairness owed to the parents, even in the
absence of any guidelines. Surely they were at least entitled to notice of
the motion which was coming before the board and the opportunity to
make submissions of some kind. The focus on legitimate expectations
obscured the principal question, which was what procedures the duty of
fairness required in the circumstances. The representation should have
been an important factor in determining this, but not, as it was used
here, in deciding whether a duty of fairness was owed.
C. Generating Legitimate Expectations
1. Express promise of a procedure
It is clear that promises that a certain procedure will be followed
give rise to legitimate expectations in Canada, as they do in Britain,133
and this is the most accepted manner in which expectations arise. These
can be in the form of statements made to the plaintiff, or representations
contained in pamphlets, policy documents, or resolutions.134 Many
courts have held that the promise must be very clearly set out: if there is
doubt that there is a promise being made, it is sometimes held that there
is no expectation. 35 These are, in my view, overcautious attempts to
restrict the doctrine-the statements in Ng and Bendahmane, 136 for
example, were far from unambiguous promises.
133 An express promise of a certain procedure was the situation in Ng, supra note 44.
134 In Qi,supra note 108, and Gaw, supra note 70, the promise was contained in a letter to the
plaintiff. In Mercier-Ndron, supra note 110, the promise was contained in documentation about the
programme enclosed with a letter to the plaintiff. In Pulp, Paperand Woodworkers of Canada Local
8 v. Canada (Minister of Agriculture), [1992] 1 F.C. 372 (T.D.) [hereinafter Local 8], aff'd (1994), 74
N.R. 37 (F.C.A.), it was contained in a publicly distributed pamphlet.
135 For example, in Thin Ice v. Winnipeg (City of) (1995), 105 Man. R. (2d) 297 (Q.B.)
[hereinafter Thin Ice], it was held, at 301-02, that a city council resolution that said "It is important
... that there be full opportunity for public review prior to council considering any required
approvals" was not a promise. In SGE, supra note 116, a letter saying the government would "liase
with your union officials with respect to these matters" (at 25), a memorandum stating that "the
Public Service Commission will discuss employee options with departments, employees, and union"
(at 28), and a letter saying "a direct dialogue with the Public Service Commission would be a useful
vehicle for the provision of information as it becomes available" (at 28), were not accepted as a
promise of consultation.
136 Supra note 77.
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Some cases have also suggested that knowledge or reliance on
the promise by the plaintiff is necessary.137 In Furey, the court went one
step further and suggested that the plaintiff must also have a belief that
the policy was binding on the agency. 38 These requirements, in my
view, are simply more attempts to find ways to further restrict the
doctrine in ways that do not fit with the purposes behind it. First, it
should be noted that reliance is not a requirement in Britain; as outlined
above, there was no reliance on the promise inNg.13 9 More importantly,
however, one of the fundamental principles behind the doctrine is that
fairness requires public agencies to keep their word and follow their
stated policies about procedure. Whether the particular plaintiff knew
about the statement at the time or took action based on it, the body has
stiff refused to do what it said it would do, and this creates a feeling and
a reality of unfairness.140 Finally, it is important to note that in Canada,
as in Britain, the person making the promise must have authority to do
so, and the promise made must not conflict with a statutory duty;
otherwise the legitimate expectation will not be protected.141
2. Regular practice
The cases also generally recognize that a regular practice of a
certain procedure being followed can give rise to a legitimate
expectation.142 Few cases have dealt explicitly with this possibility.
However, in Brink's Canada Ltd. v. Canada Council of Teamsters,1 43 the
Federal Court of Appeal held that a practice must be regularly followed
over an extended period of time in order to trigger the doctrine. Other
137 See Sunshine Coast, supra note 83 at 262-63; and Carier-Sekani Tribal Council v. Canada
(Minister of the Environment), [1992] 3 F.C. 316 (C.A.).
138 Furey, supra note 126 at 467-68. See also Haughton v. Heffley Creek (Watenvorky District)
[1995] B.C.J. No. 2711 (QL) (S.C.), aff'd [1997] B.C.J. No. 771 (QL) (C.A.).
139 See Part III(D), above.
140 See "Fair Start," supra note 2 at 280-81; MacPherson, supra note 2 at 173-74; and D.
Mullan, "Annotation to Furey v. Conception Bay Centre Roman Catholic School Board" (1993) 17
Admin. LR. (2d) 47 at 47-49.
141 See, for example, Lidder v. Canada (Minister of Employment and Immigration), [1992] 2
F.C. 621 (C.A.); and Crommer v. Workers' Compensation Board (Sask.) (1992), 98 Sask. R. 213 at
220 (Q.B.).
142 This is the situation typified by GCHIQ, supra note 51.
143 [1995] F.C.J. No. 1114 (QL) (C.A.).
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cases have held only that the practice must be "established."144 In an
early case, Alliance for Language,145 the Quebec Superior Court held
that a hearing given on one prior occasion was sufficient. It appears
likely that the Federal Court of Appeal's interpretation will be the
guiding one, and that legitimate expectations based on an established
practice will be difficult to establish. Although it may appear at first that
this is an unfortunate restriction of the doctrine, it is appropriate, in my
view, to require consistent evidence of an established practice.
Otherwise, there may be hesitancy on the part of administrative agencies
to accord hearings or other procedures when it is not necessary, for fear
they will be held to these procedures in the future. It would be
unfortunate if the doctrine of legitimate expectations were to discourage
bodies from developing their own guidelines that would provide for
consultation or give other procedural rights.
3. Substantive promises
Few plaintiffs in Canadian legitimate expectation cases have
argued for enhanced procedural protections based on an express
promise of a substantive result.1 46 In most decisions, the doctrine has
been approached as one that deals with expectations of procedure,
rather than substantive results. The focus on the fact that substantive
legitimate expectations are not protected in this country has obscured
the possibility that the promise of a substantive result could give rise to
procedural protections. However, in the Family Allowance1 47 case, it was
held that the federal Human Rights Commission's agreement to settle a
complaint about the federal family allowance program created a
legitimate expectation on the part of the attorney general that it would
be consulted and given reasons before a similar complaint was sent to a
tribunal. However, other cases have not developed this possibility, and
given Sopinka J.'s comments in Old St. Boniface and CAP it seems
unlikely.
It seems inconsistent, however, to hold that a promise or
representation about procedure will be protected, while not doing the
same for a representation that a certain result will occur or certain
144 Rural Dignity, supra note 129; and SGEu, supra note 116.
145 Supra note 128.
146 This is the situation typified by Khan, supra note 50.
147Supra note 112.
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criteria will be applied. The reluctance to do so arises, in my opinion,
only from concern that this would give rise to protecting substantive
legitimate expectations. However, holding that expectations can be
generated by a substantive promise does not mean that the government
will be held to this promise. A principle could easily be established that
substantive promises give rise to enhanced procedural protections.
The problem is clearly illustrated through the example of a
hypothetical school closing. If a letter were sent to the parents stating
that the school would not be closed without giving the parents'
association an opportunity to speak before a board meeting, this would
likely be protected under the existing doctrine, and a decision by the
board made without the parents' association's representations would be
quashed. However, if the letter stated that the school would not be
closed in the next two years-a substantive promise-there would, it
appears, be no protection. However, it only makes sense that this
stronger, substantive promise should give rise to enhanced procedural
rights, such as a hearing before the board. I would hope that as the
doctrine is developed it will be clarified that this sort of promise, too,
can have procedural effects.
D. Procedural or Substantive?
As indicated in section A of this part, most cases have held that
the legal result of a legitimate expectation is to force a body to keep a
promise it has made as to the procedure it will follow, or, presumably, to
continue following, a practice it has already followed. The decision in
CAP makes it clear that a body cannot be forced to hold its promise about
a substantive result.148  However it is not always clear what the
difference is between "procedural" and "substantive." It seems clear, for
example, that requests that the court order expenditure of public
funds,149 order a person reinstated in his or her job,150 or be allowed to
148 Many legitimate expectations claims have been rejected for this reason. See, for example,
Canada (A.G.) v. Canada (Commissioner of the Inquiry on the Blood System), [1996] 3 F.C. 259
(T.D.), aff'd (1997), 207 N.R. 1 (F.C.A.), leave to appeal to Supreme Court of Canada granted 27
March 1997; appeal heard and reserved 25 June 1997: [1997] S.C.C.A. No. 59 (QL); Libbey Canada
Inc. v. Ontario (Ministry of Labour) (1995), 26 O.R. (3d) 125 (Div. Ct.); and Apotex Inc. v. Canada
(A.G.) (1993), 68 F.T.R. 86 (F.C.T.D.).
14 9 Hamilton-Wentworth, supra note 121.
1 5 0 Girard v. Canada (Minister ofAgriculture) (1994), 79 F.T.R. 219 (P.C.T.D.).
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immigrate to Canada,lSl constitute impermissible substantive findings.
However, other cases are more ambiguous. One situation is that where
consultation with someone other than the decisionmaker is demanded.
In Local 8,152 the union challenged the decision by Agriculture Canada
to permit the use of a pesticide with which the Woodworkers' members
were to work. The union argued that a statement in an Agriculture
Canada pamphlet that "Health and Welfare Canada, Environment
Canada, Fisheries and Oceans Canada and their provincial counterparts
all participate in the decision making"153 created a legitimate
expectation that these other ministries would be consulted before the
pesticide was registered. Martin J. accepted this argument, and held
that the representations created an expectation of a procedure being
followed. However, another court held that a promise to consult
someone else was substantive, not procedural. 5 4 The latter, I believe, is
the better decision. Consultation with someone else does not seem to fit
into the principles of fairness, since its purpose is to ensure consultation
with those who are particularly affected by a decision.
Another example of the difficulty in determining whether
something is procedural or substantive is Edmonton Telephones.155 In
this case, the city of Edmonton had previously passed a by-law that its
municipal telephone company could not be sold without first holding a
referendum on the subject. When this by-law was amended and the
company sold, the applicants argued that there was a legitimate
expectation that a referendum would be held. The court rejected this
argument, holding that the right to vote on the question was a
substantive matter, not a procedural one.15 6 However, the referendum
could certainly have been seen as a consultation mechanism which could
have been incorporated into the duty of fairness, although making its
results binding would have been a substantive result. With the exception
of Local 8, the courts have generally been quite restrictive in their
definition of "procedural": for the most part, the only legitimate
151 Lok v. Canada (Solicitor General) (1993), 69 F.T.R. 129 (F.C.T.D.).
152 Supra note 134.
153 Ibid. at 399, citing Agriculture Canada, Pesticides in Perspective, Doc. No. 5206/E. (1985)
1 5 4 Morlacci v. British Columbia (Minister of Energy,. Mines and Petroleum Resources), [1995]
B.CJ. No. 53, especially para. 63 (QL) (S.C.).
155 Supra note 123.
156 It was also held that legitimate expectations did not apply since the power in question was
a legislative one. I outlined above why I believe this is not the kind of legislative decision that
should be subject to a duty of fairness. See text following note 123, supra.
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expectations that are classified as "procedural" are those that would
otherwise come under the duty of fairness.157 This is appropriate, since
having different definitions of "procedural" for the general duty of
fairness and for legitimate expectations will separate the doctrine from
the general duty of fairness, and make for a confusing test to determine
what is "procedural."
E. Conclusion
Currently, a plaintiff trying to take advantage of the doctrine of
legitimate expectations must pass several hurdles.158 It must be
demonstrated that the function being exercised is administrative, not
legislative. The plaintiff must show a continuous, established procedural
practice, or an undertaking to follow a certain procedure. It must be
shown that what is being requested is relief that would otherwise fall
under the doctrine of fairness, and is procedural, not substantive. The
result of the legitimate expectation is that the body will be held to its
undertaking in the limited circumstances in which it is held to be
applicable.
15 7 See the comments of Proudfoot J.A. in Pollard v. Surrey (District of) (1993), 76 B.C.L.R.
(2d) 292 at 301 (C.A.). An example of the confusion that can develop when this is not the approach
occurred in Baker v. Canada (Citizenship and Immigration) (1996), 142 D.L.R. (4th) 554 (F.C.A.).
Here, the plaintiff argued that the international Convention on the Rights of the Child (with
Reservations and Statement of Understandings), 20 November 1989, Can. T.S. 1992 No. 3, arts. 3, 9,
12, created the legitimate expectation that the best interests of her children would be paramount in
determining the status of her immigration application. Strayer J. held, at 567-58, that taking the
children's best interests into account was a procedural right, but that making their interests the
"primary consideration" would be a substantive right. This definition of "procedural" is very
different from what would generally be included within the duty of fairness. Fairness may require
that the decision maker hear the person's views about the interests of her children but not that these
be taken into account.
158 In addition, the fact that the definition of a legitimate expectation is so unclear has given
some judges the opportunity to create more exceptions to the doctrine. For example, in Thin Ice,
supra note 135 at 302, it was held that a resolution of city council which stated that public
consultations would occur about a change in zoning could not be protected under the legitimate
expectations doctrine because it gave general directions, not a promise, and because "[t]ime was of
the essence." In Central Kootenay (Regional District of) v. Canada (Minister of Transport) (1991), 39
F.T.R. 60 (F.C.T.D.), it was held that there had to be bad faith on the part of the public body for the
doctrine to apply.
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VI. CLARIFICATION OF THE DOCTRINE
AND FUTURE DIRECTIONS
As Part V shows, the process of establishing a legitimate
expectation claim is a difficult one, and claims are not often successful.
Several authors have argued that legitimate expectations should be
expanded, that it should be used as an exception to the principle that
legislative functions are not subject to procedural fairness, and that it
should be expanded to include substantive protection of legitimate
expectations. While cases where the doctrine has been argued point out
the importance of addressing these issues, I believe that simply "latching
onto" legitimate expectations is not the most appropriate way to protect
the needs demonstrated by these cases. This part will be divided into
three sections-in the first I will suggest the appropriate ways to clarify
and "Canadianize" the doctrine; the second will deal with the possibility
of using legitimate expectations as an exception to the rule that
legislative functions are not subject to the duty of fairness; and the third
will address briefly the question of how "substantive legitimate
expectations" should be given protection.
A. Clarifying Legitimate Expectations
As the last part demonstrates, one of the largest problems with
the legitimate expectations doctrine is that its place relative to fairness is
not clearly defined. This has occurred because it has been applied in a
very different context than that in which it was developed. First, the use
of legitimate expectations as part of the threshold to determine whether
a duty of fairness exists should be emphatically rejected. A heavier
reliance on legitimate expectations as a threshold question can only lead
to a narrowing of the definition of "rights, privileges, and interests" in
the Canadian context. This would then lead to the denial of procedural
fairness to those who would qualify under the broader test, but who had
not been given representations by the body that a certain procedure
would be followed. Using legitimate expectations as a threshold device
can only lead, over the long term, to a restriction of the circumstances in
which a general duty of fairness is owed.159
159 See M. Paterson, "Legitimate Expectations and Fairness: New Directions in Australian
Law" (1992) 18 Monash U. L. Rev. 70. See also the reasons of Brennan J. in Kioa v. West (1985),
159 C.L.R. 550 at 616-22 (Aust. H.C.).
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In most of the cases where the doctrine has been used
successfully, a legitimate expectation has defined the content of the duty
of fairness. The representation of the decisionmaker about the
procedure that will be followed, or the regular use of a certain
procedure, defines what fairness requires. This, it seems to me, can and
should be done without a complicated doctrine of legitimate
expectations. As L'Heureux-Dub6 J. held in Knight, "the concept of
procedural fairness is eminently variable, and its content is to be decided
in the specific context of each case."160 Legitimate expectations as it is
currently being applied in Canadian courts could, in my opinion, be
summed up in a single statement of principle-if a decisionmaker has
stated that a certain procedure will be followed, or a procedure has been
continually followed over a period of time, the doctrine of fairness will
require that procedure. The concept could be simplified and
incorporated into the general flexible character of the doctrine of
fairness if it were seen in this way.161
A similar result could arise from a representation of a
substantive nature, to which protection should be extended. If someone
is given a representation by a decisionmaker that they will receive a
certain benefit or that certain criteria will be used for a decision, a
revised doctrine of legitimate expectations should lead to the result that
the duty to act fairly requires more than it otherwise would if the body
wishes to apply different criteria or break its promise. For example, if in
a certain situation the duty of fairness would have required only the right
to make written representations, there may be a requirement of an oral
hearing if a decisionmaker intends to break a promise. This use of the
doctrine would constitute a recognition that backtracking on a promise is
more serious than making a decision where the person has no
expectations, and gives rise to the right to more "trial-like" procedures
than the decision would have otherwise required.
Defining legitimate expectations as part of the process of
determining the content of the duty of fairness has several advantages.
First, it would reinforce the fact, as Sopinka J. stated in Old St. Boniface,
that legitimate expectations is part of the duty of fairness rather than
separate from it. Keeping fairness as a unified but flexible concept,
which applies in most situations but where the content varies depending
on the circumstances, is consistent with the spirit of cases such as
Nicholson and Knight. Relying on specific categories and doctrines
160 Knight, supra note 11 at 682.
161 Mullan accepts that if legitimate expectations is not to be used to review legislative
decisions, this is its proper application: see "Fair Start," supra note 2 at 282.
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seems a step backward into complicated and inflexible classifications and
categorizations. 162
As I have pointed out throughout this analysis, one danger of the
present use of the concept of legitimate expectations is that it may
restrict or hold back the growth of the general concept of fairness. A
concept of legitimate expectations that applied only at the stage of
determining the content of the duty, and was seen as one of the factors
to be taken into account in determining that content would help avoid
this result. Decisions such as that of the Newfoundland Court of Appeal
in Furey, where the court ignored the possibility that the parents might
have rights under the general duty of fairness, would hopefully be
avoided.
I believe it is particularly important that legitimate expectations
be seen as a concept that adds to what would otherwise be required by
the duty to act fairly, rather than simply defining it. It is important to
keep in mind that fairness may require more than the expectations
generated by the representation or the practice. The danger of allowing
legitimate expectations to define rather than increase the content of the
duty of fairness is shown in Bawolak Ltd. v. Exroy Resources,163 where it
was held that since a certain procedure had been regularly followed, the
plaintiff had a legitimate expectation of that procedure and the duty of
fairness could not require more. The legitimate expectations argument
was raised by the decision-making body to justify the procedure it
followed. This is not an appropriate use of the concept, since it allows
the decisionmaker to define for itself what procedural protections it
owes, and assumes that a procedure that no one challenges for a long
period of time is fair. Legitimate expectations should be seen as a
doctrine that increases the procedural duties owed by the
decisionmaker, rather than as a justification for procedures that might
not otherwise meet the standards of fairness.
For the above reasons, however, it would be inappropriate in this
context to extend legitimate expectations to "nature of the interest"
claims. While these claims are important in the British context, where
the concept is used as a threshold device, the nature of the interest is
already taken into account in both the threshold test of "rights, interests,
or privileges," and in the flexible determination of the content of the
162 For the opposite view, see Small, supra note 2 at 155-56.
163 (1992), 11 Admin. L.R. (2d) 137 (Que. C.A.), leave to appeal to Supreme Court of Canada
refused: [1993] 2 S.C.R. vi.
1997]
OSGOODE HALL LAW JOURNAL
duty of fairness in Canada. There is no need here for nature of the
interest legitimate expectation claims.164
Since Nicholson, the duty of fairness has developed as a broad
and flexible concept: while the threshold to give rise to the duty is
relatively easy to meet, the procedures required by the duty are
determined by the circumstances. Legitimate expectations can best fit
into this paradigm as a recognition that representations or practices of a
decision-making body do have a legal effect, and are important, if not
paramount considerations in determining what fairness requires. This
will recognize the principle, expressed in many of the leading British
legitimate expectation cases, that people should be able to rely on
representations made to them by government agencies, and that it is a
serious matter giving rise to enhanced procedural protections when they
do not.
B. Legislative Functions
The Supreme Court has been heavily criticized for its holding in
cAt' that legislative functions are not reviewable under the doctrine of
legitimate expectations. Joan Small, for example, argues that legitimate
expectation cases should be seen as exceptions to the rule that legislative
decisions do not attract the duty of fairness, although she also argues
that there are other situations in which review of legislative functions
should occur.165 In this section, I will expand on my argument that while
the legitimate expectation cases point out the need for broader review of
functions that have been considered "legislative," expansion of the duty
of fairness should not be done through this doctrine.
Legislative functions have been excluded from the duty of
fairness on the grounds, among others, that they are broad decisions,
affecting many people, based on policy and analogous to parliamentary
decisions.16 6 How, it is argued, could the large number of people
affected by such a decision be given a right to be heard or consulted?
Why should anyone have any special rights when the decision is based on
policy and therefore affects the population at large? Requiring a
hearing in these circumstances, it is argued, would radically extend the
courts' power of review to many new situations, and the courts are
164 See "Fair Start," supra note 2 at 276-79.
165 Small, supra note 2 at 153-58. See also "Fair Start," supra note 2 at 281-83.
166 Craven, supra note 5 at 582.
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ill-equipped to deal with matters of policy, or the procedures applicable
to those matters. As one answer to these arguments, legitimate
expectations is suggested as an appropriate way to restrict the number of
situations in which the duty of fairness would apply to legislative
functions. Only where there was a promise or representation to the
plaintiff that a certain course of conduct would be followed would the
decision be reviewable on fairness grounds.1 67
The facts of many legitimate expectations cases show a
justification for reviewing legislative functions, and for this reason, too,
legitimate expectations may seem like the appropriate response to the
blanket exclusion of legislative functions. For example, the cAP and
Hamilton-Wentworth cases suggest situations in which it would be proper
to at least require some consultation before a government makes a
policy change which goes against people's expectations. In Hamilton-
Wentworth, given the fact that the municipality had spent money and
made plans on the basis of the assurances of the provincial government,
it seems that the least that could be done is to give the municipality a
chance to make representations about why the policy should not be
implemented. The province of British Columbia in cAP had taken
similar steps based on the existence of the agreement.
Another reason for the enthusiasm is, of course, the fact that, in
Britain and Australia, legitimate expectations constitute the exception to
the exclusion of legislative functions. Litigants relying on jurisprudence
from these countries have picked up on the doctrine as a way to win
their case, and the common administrative law background has made it
appear appropriate to follow them in Canadian decisions. However, the
fact that authors in these countries are calling for a broader basis on
which consultation will be imposed should give Canadians reason to
pause before enthusiastically embracing such a narrow concept.! 68
I agree that it is essential that the duty of fairness be applied
more broadly to the making of decisions now classified as "legislative."
When the power to make decisions that are "legislative and general" is
delegated to the executive or other bodies, the procedural processes of
Parliament do not apply. Decisionmaking in these contexts requires the
participation of and consultation with those specifically affected by a
decision, in order to ensure that a democratic decision is made which
also takes into account the interests of those with a greater interest in its
outcome than the average citizen. Using the Canadian version of
167 Small, supra note 2 at 155.
168 Craven, supra note 5 at 586-602; and Administrative Law,supra note 6 at 256-62.
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legitimate expectations as the vehicle to expand the concept of the duty
of fairness into legislative decisionmaking, however, would leave this
concept far too restrictive. A dynamic concept of fairness in the review
of legislative decisions could not be built on legitimate expectations.
First, this would entail a return to the use of legitimate
expectations as a threshold device. Presumably, what Mullan and Small
would advocate is that if a decision were held to be legislative, the duty
of fairness would apply only if there were a legitimate expectation at
issue. This would mean that the doctrine was fulfilling two very different
functions-as a principle for determination of the content of the duty of
fairness in cases where the decision was administrative, and as a
definition of the threshold (and presumably also the content) for the
duty of fairness when the decision was legislative. It seems improper and
unworkable that the same set of principles and the same conditions
would apply in these different circumstances, and restricting or
expanding the conditions for one use of the concept might confuse or
lead to inappropriate results in its other uses. Arguably, this has been
one of the difficulties in the application of the doctrine in Britain.
However, a more important issue is whether it is desirable to give
procedural rights when delegated policy is being made only in the
limited situations where there is a legitimate expectation. "Nature of the
interest" legitimate expectations have been rejected in Canada (rightly,
in my view, given the context) and legitimate expectations can only be
based on a practice or a representation. However, in my view, the
interests which review of legislative decisions should protect are
different and much broader than these situations. I accept that a
potential problem with extending the duty of fairness to legislative
functions is that then the duty could be conceivably owed to everyone
(because everyone is potentially affected by a policy decision). However,
restricting the concept of the duty to those with legitimate expectations
generated by an express representation or regular practice would be
going too far in restricting the duty.
In my opinion, a duty to act fairly in the context of legislative
decisionmaking should require the body to act fairly towards all those
who are particularly affected by the decision being made.169 Those to
169 The arguments in the following paragraphs are heavily influenced by the ideas expressed
in I.M. Young, "Justice and Communicative Democracy" in R.S. Gottlieb, ed., Radical Philosophy:
Tradition, Counter-Tradition, Politics (Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 1993) 123; P.J.
Monahan, "Judicial Review and Democracy: A Theory of Judicial Review" (1987) 21 U.B.C. L.
Rev. 87; and C.R. Sunstein, After the Rights Revolution: Reconceiving the Regulatory State
(Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1990). Small, supra note 2 at 153-58 expresses some
of the same concerns.
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whom the duty is owed, in my view, should have a particular interest,
something more than the average citizen. This will ensure that review
for fairness in the case of delegated legislation reflects the same goals of
the duty of fairness for administrative functions-to ensure that those
whose lives or activities are affected by a decision have the opportunity
to be consulted. An individual is entitled to be heard in accordance with
the principles of fairness, in part, because the decision has a particular
impact on that person, and they will have no other way to attempt to
influence the decisionmaker. Delegated "policy" decisions often affect
groups or individuals in a similar way, and their effects on them are
much more like "administrative and specific" decisions than broad
choices made by legislatures. The electoral process will not take their
concerns into account because, although there may be more than one
person affected, the group still represents a small part of the population.
Because of this, they have no real power to influence elections.
Extending the duty of fairness to these decisions would ensure that the
voices of these specially affected groups are heard when the legislature
delegates policy decisions. Of course, this duty may well be different
than that which would be required if the decision were "individual and
specific," but a general requirement to seek out and allow consultation
and input is essential.
Consider, for example, the B.C. and Yukon Hotels'Association1 70
case. It was the members of the association and those in their position
who were required to pay the deposits on the kegs. Although the
decision to implement the system was a general, policy decision, they
had a special interest in the question of whether it would be
implemented. An implication into the statutory mandate of the liquor
commission that it must consult with those who must pay the price of the
regulations seems an appropriate way to ensure that the special needs of
those whom a decision will particularly affect are taken into account as
well as the broader needs of the public, and, as may have been the case
here, other groups with more access to the commission.
A similar argument would apply where a group enjoyed a certain
benefit that was to be modified or removed. An example is Sunshine
Coast.171 If the decision about the grade levels at which French
immersion will be provided was a legislative one (although this is of
course debatable), it seems to me that the parents should have had a
right to be treated fairly (whether or not the board members made
170 Supra note 124.
171 Supra note 83.
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representations to them), because they had children attending French
immersion classes. Although the board's decision may have been a
policy decision, these parents had likely made plans for their children's
schooling on the basis of the existence of the French immersion
program, and their children had benefitted from its existence. These
facts should be most important in deciding whether the board should
have to consult them.
The need to imply participation rights becomes even more clear
when executive decisions are considered. Determinations such as the
amount of welfare payments or tuition fees are often delegated to the
executive to be set by regulation. While large benefit cuts or fee
increases may be considered to be in the broad "public interest," certain
people bear the brunt of these decisions, and it is crucial to require some
consultation with them when the decisions are being made. At the very
least, this is because people have planned their lives based on the
existing state of affairs. Welfare recipients, for example, have signed
leases and made budgeting decisions on the basis of the amount of
assistance being provided. Students may have entered academic
programs or planned their finances on the basis of being able to afford
fees at a certain level. Without consultation, these special needs may be
ignored by the delegated decisionmaker. Although there may have been
no clear representations to these groups that their benefits or fees would
remain at a certain level for a certain time, the special needs of people in
these situations are at least as important as those to whom
representations have been made. They would not be taken into account,
however, if review of legislative decisions was based on legitimate
expectations.
The criteria I am suggesting are not unrelated to legitimate
expectations: "nature of the interest" claims form part of the doctrine of
legitimate expectations in Britain, although they are used in a somewhat
different way. Building on the Canadian concept of legitimate
expectations would make the nature of the interest a secondary
consideration, whereas I think it must be front and centre when
extending the duty of fairness to legislative functions. For this reason, I
reject the argument that legitimate expectations could be used as a
starting point, and nature of the interest claims could be also added as
triggers for the duty of fairness in reviewing legislative decisions. 72
Focusing on promises would distract the courts, as it often already has,
from the centrality of the applicant's stake in the decision.
172 Small, supra note 2 at 155.
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This fits with broader conceptions of democracy.173 Policy
decisions will presumably take account, in some measure, of the broader
needs of the public. However, those who are particularly affected may
not have the power at the ballot box, or the strength of voice in public
debate, to make their views heard or have a real influence on
decisionmakers. Delegated policymakers should have the obligation to
consider, or at least hear, the views of who will face particular
consequences because of their decisions. Because of the particular
effects of decisions on them, those groups who do not have the ability to
influence or change democratic decisions should at least have the right
to explain their needs and the potential repercussions of the decisions
for them. Legitimate expectations would not reflect these principles.
C. Substantive Legitimate Expectations
It is not my intention in this article to discuss the merits of
protecting the substance of legitimate expectations. The considerations
involved in this issue are quite different from those regarding the
doctrine of fairness.174 Protecting substantive legitimate expectations
raises questions about whether the representatives of one government
can bind those of another, how much decisionmakers can fetter their
discretion, and whether agencies and the executive should be
encouraged to promulgate ,or discouraged from promulgating, general
policies and criteria upon which they will make their decisions. These
are very different from the considerations involved in determining the
content of the duty of fairness. For the same reasons I set out in the last
section, it seems inappropriate and impossible for one doctrine to fulfil
such different functions and respond well to the needs of different areas
of administrative law. I believe, therefore, that substantive enforcement
of promises should be done independently, on the basis of a concept of
public law estoppel17S or another doctrine. Legitimate expectations
should remain exclusively a concept for determination of the content of
the duty of fairness.
173 For a discussion about legitimate expectations and democracy, see D. Dyzenhaus,
"Developments in Administrative Law: The 1991-92 Term" (1993) 4 Supreme Court L.R. (2d) 177
at 189-95.
174 For discussions of the desirability of recognizing substantive legitimate expectations or the
doctrine of public law estoppel in Canada, see Cartier, supra note 2 at 110-15; and "Fair Start,"
supra note 2 at 283-90.
175 See "Fair Start," supra note 2 at 286-90.
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VII. CONCLUSION
The doctrine of legitimate expectations has had a confused
development in Canada, owing to its importation from Britain without
proper concern for the differences in this country's administrative law.
The doctrine has been severely restricted, but applied without proper
regard for its place in Canadian law. I have demonstrated throughout
this article how too much reliance on the concept may lead to a
restriction rather than an expansion of the duty of fairness. In applying
legitimate expectations, courts have focused on the particular conditions
for this narrow doctrine, rather than looking at the broad purposes of
the doctrine of fairness and the principles behind it. It is for these
reasons that I reject the use of this concept as a device to expand judicial
review into the area of legislative decisionmaking or into the protection
of promises of substantive results made by decisionmakers. It is much
more advisable to find Canadian responses to these problems that better
reflect the substantive values behind the duty of fairness and that are
more consistent with the broad, flexible, and adaptive duty which has
developed since Nicholson. Legitimate expectations is best seen as a
doctrine whose function is to increase the content of the duty of fairness
where a certain procedure has been regularly followed, or a
representation has been made to the plaintiff. However, a redefinition
of the concept of the "nature of the interest" should be front and centre
in determining when legislative decisions are subject to a duty of
fairness, as Canadian administrative law moves, I hope, towards a
conception of the duty that better reflects the values of participatory
democracy.
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